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Commodity-exporting  countries have sometimes found them-
selves  worse  off after  a boom  than  before  it, due  to fiscal  misman-
agement  of the boom  proceeds.  Good  fiscal  control  during  booms
can temporarily  acclerate  the rate of economic  development.
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Revenues in countries that rely heavily on one or  *  Allocate public investment programs to
two primary commodities tend to fluctuate  sound projects that do not involve burdensome
widely with prices in intemational markets. This  recurring costs.
fluctuation is especially wide when export taxes
are a large pan of the total tax base but also  *  Keep govemment spending at levels
when the private sector reaps most of the gains  consistent with long-run budget expectations.
from booming  prices.
* Maintain prudent extemal borrowing and
Most developing countries have over  foreign exchange reserve policies.
consumed in response to windfalls from surges
in world prices. In many cases govemment  Programs along these lines have the poten-
spending has outstripped the gain in revenues.  tial to reduce a country's debt and restore
These sharp increases in govenmment  spending  economic growth.
are difficult to reverse when the boom ends and
often lead to large fiscal deficits rather than  This paper is a background paper for the
surpluses.  1988 World Development Report.  Copies are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Countries like Cameroon and Colombia,  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
however, whose policies emphasized conserva-  contact Rhoda Blade-Charest, room S13-060,
tive fiscal management, have generally benefited  extension 33754.
from booms. The most effective government
policies:
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A large  number  of developing  count-ies  rely  heavily  on one  or two
primary  commodity  exports  as an important  source  of national  income  and
foreign  exchange. As Table  1 shows,  the  share  of primary  commodities
(including  fuels,  minerals,  and  metals)  in tot..  exports  of all  developing
countries  was  60 percent  in  1985. Although  this  ratio  has fallen  gradually
from  80 percent  in 1965  to its  present  level,  primary  commodity  exports
continue  to loom  large  in  the  export  activity  of low-income  and  middle-income
LDCs.
In  virtually  all  of these  countries,  commodity  market  developments  have
important  effects  on the  government  budget. Not  only  do trade  taxes  generate
a  large  fraction  of total  government  revenue. In  many  countries  the
government  has a direct  ownership  stake  in the  production  of primary
commodities,  especially  in the  cases  of fuels,  metals  and  minerals. In
others  it  benefits  indirectly  through  its  role  as an international  marketing
agent  for  private  producers,  because  it  passes  on less  than  100  percent  of
the  world  price  to  producers.
The  booming  world  commodity  markets  of the  1970s  and  the  post-war  lows
for  real  commodity  prices  in the  mid-1980s  have created  complex  economic
management  problems  for  commodity  exporters.  1/  The experiences  of
commodity-exporting  LDCs  during  the  1970s  have  made it  abundantly  clear  that
I/  In  July 1987,  the  IMF's  index  of 39  primary  commodity  prices  hit its
lowest  level  in  the  post  World  War II  period  (IMF  Survey 16,  14 (July  13,
1987),  p. 209).  In the  third  qi'arter  of 1987,  some  commodity  prices,  notably
those  for  metals  and  agricultural  raw  materials,  moved  upward  sharply,
contributing  to a general  improvement  in the  index  before  the  October  1987
stock  market  collapse  impacted  the  commodity  markets.
1TAMLE  1
STRUCTURES  OF MECHADISE EXPORTS
(percentages  of  total  merchandise  exports)
Fuels,  minerals  Other  primary  Total  primary
and  metals  commodities  commiodities
1965  1985  1965  1985  1965  1985
Low-income economies  25  31  56
China  and  India  25  22  47
Other  24  23  67  53  91  76
Middle-income  34  40  46  19  80  59
Lower middle-income  28  51  63  29  91  80
Upper  middle-income  37  37  38  16  75  53
Developing  countries  32  39  48  21  80  60
Oil  exporters  66  84  29  7  95  91
Exporters  of  manufactures  9  13  40  17  49  30
Highly  indebted  countries  38  46  51  26  89  72
Sub-Sahara  Africa  32  63  60  31  92  94
High  Income  Oil  Exporters  98  98  1  99  98
Industrial  Market  Economies  9  11  21  13  30  24
Source:  World  Development  Report  1987,  Statistical  Appendix:  Table  II,  p.  222-223export  booms  caused  by surges  in  world  prices  (or  natural  resource
discoveries),  while  potentially  beneficial,  can  give  rise  to  major  internal
and  external  imbalances.  In  many  cases,  countries  have responded  to  booms
in  a manner  that,  when  viewed  with  hindsight,  At  least,  can  hardly  be viewed
as optimal.
Coping  with the  commodity  busts  of the  1980s  has  been  made  more
difficult  by the  legacy  of earlier  boom mismanagement  which  left  many  LDCs
with  overextended,  inefficient  investment  programs,  excessive  external  debt,
and large  structural  fiscal  deficits. This  has  made it  difficult  for  fiscal
policy  to  play  a stabilizing  role in  the  1980s  as  per  capita  income  growth
and  employment  slowed  and, in  many  cases,  turned  negative.
The  objective  of this  paper  is  to discuss  the  conduct:  of fisca.  policy
in  commodity-exporting  countries  faced  with  periodic  surges  in  world  prices.
By capitalizing  on positive  developments  of this  sort,  countries  can  greatly
improve  their  growth  and  debt  servicing  prospects. Poor  management  of booms,
on the  other  hand, is  not  only  a lost  opportunity; in extreme  cases,  the
country  may end  up worse  off  after  the  boom  subsides.
Concern  about  poor  management  of booms  is  based  on the  experience  of the
past 20 or 30  years. Most  developing  countries  have tended  to  overconsume
during  periods  of temporary  or medium-term  booms,  and  have  often  experienced
liquidity  crises  when the  booms  ended. In  many  cases  countries'  foreign
reserve  positions  have  been little  better,  or even  worse,  after  the  boom
subsided  than  before  it  began.  (See  Davis,  1983). Many  of these  countries
allowed  regulated  price  structures  and  particularly  exchange  rates  to  deviate
substantially  from  free-market  levels,  discouraging  efficient  resource
allocation  and  greatly  compounding  the  problems  of adjustment  to subsequent
2drops  in  export  prices. Countries  that  managed  favorable  terms  of trade
shocks  well  were typically  those  that:  (i)  did  not  allow  prices  (e.g.
exchange  rates,  agricultural  producer  prices,  and  wages)  to get  badly  out  of
line,  (ii)  did  not indulge  in  wasteful  and  inefficient  investment,  or
investments  that  involved  burdensome  recurrent  costs  into  the  foreseeable
future,  (iii)  limited  increases  in  government  spending  to levels  consistent
with the  long-run  trends  in  revenue  collection,  and (iv) maintained  prudent
ex;ernal  borrowing  and foreign  exchange  reserve  policies.  2.1
Clearly,  periodic  windfall  gains  offer  a unique  potential  to reduce
external  imbalances  and  restore  economic  growth.  3/  This  paper  highlights
the lessons  from  past  booms  and  busts  for  the  conduct  of fiscal  and  related
policies.
2/ Countries  whose  policies  during  the  past  decade  have exhibited  most  of
these  characteristics  include  Botswanai,  Cameroon,  China,  India,  Pakistan,
Korea,  and  Thailand.
3/  These  concerns  take  on special  importance  for  the  World  Bank  in
countries  where  the  Bank is  supporting  structural  adjustment  programs.
Temporary  increases  in resources  from  export  bonanzas  may  facilitate
structural  adjustment  programs  that  are  being  postponed,  allegedly  because  of
insufficient  foreign  exchange. Issues  of the  appropriate  timing  of such
programs  from  a macro  stability  standpoint  must  of course  be addressed.  See
Cuddington  (1986)  for  a discussion  of this  aspect  of  boom management. On the
other  hand,  misuse  of the  additional  foreign  exchange  could  easily  undermine
structural  adjustment  efforts.
3II.  BOOMING  SECTOR  ECONOMICS  AND  THE  DUTCH  DISEASE
Analytical  work on the  aggregate  and  sectoral  impacts  of terms  of trade
shocks  and  natural  resource  discove.  . mushroomed  as commodity  markets
boomed  in  the  1970s.  Hence,  economist.,  now  have  a good  unders-dnding  of  how
various  types  of  economies  respond  to  these  shocks,  and  situations  where  some
sort  of public  sector  intervention  to "manage  the  export  boom"  is  potentially
beneficial. Both  microeconomic  or allocational  aspects  and  macroeconomic
aspects  must  be considered  because:  (i)  the  boom  initially  impacts  the
booming  sector,  but is  propagated  to other  sectors  as domestic  demand
increases  and factor  markets  adjust,  and (ii)  external  shocks  have a direct
impact  on a country's  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  therefore  have important
monetary  and  financial  consequences.
A positive  terms  of trade  shock  caused  by a sharp  upward  movement  in
the  price  of a country's  primary  commodity  exports  implies  a rise  in real
income  in the  current  period  and,  depending  on the  duration  of the  boom  and
its  repercussions  on other  sectors  of the  economy,  in several  subsequent
periods. The allocational  consequences  of the  boom are  typically  summarized
by focusing  on two  effects:  the  sDending  effect  and  the  resource  movement
effect.  4/  For  short-lived  booms  the  spending  effect  is likely  to  be the
more important  of the  two.  The  spending  effect  refers  to the  higher  level  of
domestic  spending  on both  traded  and  nontraded  goods  as a result  of the
wealth  gain implied  by the  improved  terms  of trade. The  resource  movement
4/  The  same  effects  are  relevant  in the  case  where  the  boom  results
from  the  discovery  of a natural  resource,  such  as the  Dutch  or  British
discoveries  of North  Sea  oil,  rather  than  a favorable  terms  of trade  shock.
4effect  in  relevant  in  situations  where  the  booming  sector  is  not an isolated
"enclave,"  so that  higher  prices  and  profits  in  the  booming  sector  induce
producers  to  hire productive  resources  from  the "lagging"  tradeablos  sector
or the  nontradeables  sector,  or from  the  pool  of unemployed  (if  the  economy
is  operating  at less  than  full  capacity  prior  to the  boom).
In the  most straightforward  case  where  full  employment  prevails,  the
spending  effect  has several  important  consequences.  First,  an increased
demand  for imports  occurs,  as domestic  demand  for  tradeable  goods  rises.
Here "tradeable  goods"  refers  to goods  that  are  not  sheltered  by quotas;  i.e.
they  are  freely  available  at  prevailing  world  prices  plus any  domestic  tariff
levy.  5/ 6/
Second,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates.  Unlike  imports  (in  small
economies,  at least),  the  supply  of  nontradeables  is  not  perfectly  elastic  at
the  pre-boom  price. Hence,  the  spending  effect,  to the  extent  that  it is
directed  towards  nontradeables,  causes  their  relative  price  in terms  of
tradeables  to rise. That is,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates.  This
causes  nontradeables  producers  to  bid  up  wages,  enticing  labor  to reallocate
from the  tradeables  sector  to  nontradeables.  Thus the  real  product  wage in
terms  of tradeables  rises,  but the  real  product  wage in  nontradeables  falls
(as  the  marginal  productivity  of labor  declines).
Third,  in  the  presence  of real  wage  stickiness,  the  sectoral
reallocation  of labor  may  be accompanied  by a transitional  increase  in
5/  Although  the  tneoretical  literature  has  not  emphasized  this  aspect,
both the  surge  in  exports  and  the induced  increase  in import  demand  will lead
to  an increase  in  government  revenue  from  trade  taxes. In  practice,  these
budgetary  consequences  of the  boom are  extremely  important.
6/  Tradeable  goods  sheltered  by quotas  in  effect  become  nontradeables  in
terms  of  how their  prices  respond  to the  boom.
5unemployment.  This  situation  arises  when  nominal  wages  are  linked  to  * price
index  that  places  a heavy  weight  on the  price  of output  in the  booming  sector
and/or  prices  of nontradeables.  which  are  bid  up  by the  ap.nding  effect  of
the  boom.  Thes.  price  increases  are  reflected  quickly  in  higher  nominal
wages  in the  presence  of real  wage stickiness  due to indexing. The  higher
nominal  wages  imply  higher  real  product  wages  in the  laggirg  sector,  and
hence  a fall  in sectoral  employment. Depending  on the  magnitude  of this  drop
in lagging  sector  employment  relative  to the increase  in  employment  in the
booming  sector  (and  perhaps  the  nontradeables  sector),  it is  possible  that
total  employment  falls  during  an export  boom.  7/
Fourth,  "de-industrialization"  occurs. The reduction  in  employment  and
output  of the lagging  tradeables  sector  caused  by real  exchange  rate
appreciation  is  often  referred  to  as de-industrialization  or de-
agriculturalization,  depending  on the  lagging  sector  involved. Although  this
reallocation  of resources  away  from  the  non-booming  tradeables  sector  is  an
economic  mechanism  that  helps  to restore  market  equilibrium,  it is  often
considered  undesirable  from  a social  standpoint,  particularly  if it  occurs  on
a large  scale  and the  boom is expected  to  be short-lived  rather  than
"permanent." For  example,  the  temporary  loss  in  production  may entail  a
socially  costly  loss  of development  momentum  in  cases  from  the  lagging  sector
provides  positive  externalities  (such  as those  arising  from  learning  by
doing,  which  depends  on cumulative  production  experience). In  the  presence
of capital  market  imperfection  and  other  plausible  assumptions,  the  optimal
subsidy  to  production  in the  lagging  sector  should  be increased  during
7/  See  Neary  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1985)  for  a  more  detailed  discussion
of the  implications  of real  wage rigidity.
6temporary  booms  to  prevent  an  excessive  contraction  of that  sector.  B/  In
other  cases  the  presence  of nominal  wage  and  price  stickiness  may  cause  the
welfare  losses  from  do-industrialization  during  boom  periods.
It should  be noted  that  an export  boom,  which  by definition  either
involves  a surge  in the  world  price  of exportables  (i.e.  an improvement  in
the  terms  of trade)  or an increase  *n  productive  capacity  in the  booming
sector (due to e.g. a resource  discovery), has an ambiguous effect on the
balance  of trade. It  depends  on the  boom's  relative  impact  on saving  and
investme.t,  which  in  turn  depends  on the  expected  size  and  duration  or .
boom.  For  booms  that  are  expected  to  be short-lived  ("temporary"),  there  is
a presumpti.n  that  a positive  terms  of trade  shock  will improve  the  current
account.  9/  The temporary  rise  in income  should  cause  an increase  in
current  spending  that  is less  than  the  gain  in income. (This  would  certainly
be true if  households  and  governments  both  consumed  according  to the
permanent  income  theory.)  Hence,  national  saving  should  rise. This  will  tend
to improve  the  current  account  of the  balance  of payments. Working  against
this  tendency  will  be any  increase  in  domestic  investment  resulting  from  the
boom.  The  effect  of the  boom on investment  will  depend  importantly  on whether
any  credit-constraint  facing  firms  and/or  the  government  is relaxed  during
the  boom.  If firms  face  effective  demand  constraints  inma  Keynesian
unemployment  environment  prior  to  the  boom,  the  spending  effect  may induce
significant  increases  in investment  as firms  anticipate  higher  future  demand.
8/  See  van  Wijnbergen  (1984)  for  a detailed  analysis  on this  point.
9/  Svensson  and  Razin  (1983)  show  that  this  must  be the  case in  a model
with optimal  intertemporal  saving  behavior  by housseholds.  Investment
decisions  by firms  and  all  government  activities  are ignored  in  their  analysis.
7The  above  discussion  of the  spendlng  effect  of the  boom and  its
consequences  concludes  that  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  and  do-
industrialization  --  a sectoral  reallocation  of production  away  from
tradeables  towards  nontradeables  --  are  unambiguous  effects  of a surge  in
export  prices. The resgurce  movement  effect  acknowledges  that  in some
economies,  th'  high  price  of the  booming  commodity  will  draw  resources  into
the  booming  sector  from  both the  tradeables  and  nontradeables  sectors. This
is important  for  two  reasons. First,  it  may  cause  the  contractlon  in  the
tradeables  sector  to  be even  more  severe  than  it  would  be in  the  case  where
the  booming  sector  is an  enclave.  10/  Second,  if resources  are  drown  from
the  nontradeables  sector  in  order  to  expand  booming  sector  production,
nontradeables  prices  may  have to rise  further  to  clear  the  market. That  is,
the  leftward  shift  of the  nontradeables  supply  curve  exacerbates  the  real
exchange  rate  appreciation  caused  by the  positive  spending  effect  of the  boom
on nontradeables  demand  curve. In this  case  where  the  resource  movement
effect  is allowed  for,  therefore,  the  net  effect  of the  boom on  nontradeables
output  and  employment  becomes  ambiguous. In  sum,  both the  real  appreciation
and the  de-industrialization  effects  of the  boom  are  strengthened  when there
is resource  movement  into  the  boom'ng  sector. Hence,  policy  concern  over  the
potentially  adverse  consequences  of the  boom is  likely  to  be heightened.
10/  Bevan  et al. (1986)  point  out  that  some  of the  nontradeables  whose
prices  rise  during  booms  are  nontradeable  (or  protected)  capital  goods. If
the  boom is  temporary,  the  relative  price  oc these  capital  goods  will  rise,
not only  with respect  to tradeables,  but in  terms  of  nontradeable  consumption
goods. Two  important  consequences  result  from  this  skift  in relative  prices:
(l)  the  proportion  of the  windfall  that  is invested  rather  than  consumed  will
fall  as the  relative  price  of  new  capital  goods  rises,  and (2)  wealth  is
transferred  from  rural  to  urban  residents,  assumirg  the  latter  group
predominates  among  owners  of the  existing  capital  stock  whose  market  value
has risen.
8II.  DISTINGUISHING PERMANENT  AND  CYCLICAL  SHOCKS
Before appropriate  macroeconomic  policies  for  dealing  with  sharp
ch&nges  in the  terms  of trade  can  be formulated,  at least  three  basic
questions  must  be addressed. First,  what is  the  expected  duration  of the
shock? Is it  likely  to  be "temrorary"  or "pArmanent?"  Second,  what  is the
degree  of  uncertainty  about  future  prices  and  other  key  variables? Third,  to
what  extent  would  the  private  sector  respond  sub-optimally  to  various  shocks,
if  left  to its  own  devices? Would  government  intervention,  in the  form  of
macroeconomic  stabilization  policy,  for  example,  be  welfare-improving,  given
the  behavior  of the  private  sector. The  present  section  addresses  the  first
two  of these  questions.  They,  in turn,  provide  essential  input  in  addressing
the  third  question  about  optimal  policy  responses  later  in the  paper.
To the  extent  that  positive  shocks  are  perceived  to  be permanent
(reflecting,  e.g.,  "structural"  changes  in  the  economy)  rather  than  cyclical
fluctuations,  the  economy  as a  whole  will  be able  to sustain  permanently
higher  levels  of consumption  expenditure.  Conversely,  permanent  negative
shocks  necessitate  downward  adjustment  of ccisumption,  not financing  of  now-
unsustainable  consumption  levels. The relative  responsibility  of the  private
and  public  sectors  for  these  adjustments  in  consumption  depends  more on  one's
beliefs  about  the  appropriate  role  and  size  of the  government,  as  well as
long-term  development  objectives,  rather  than  on  countercyclical
stabilization  goals.
If shocks  are  perceived  to  be cyclical  or temporary  in  nature,  the
optimal  response  for  the  economy  as a whole  is  to estimate  the  present  value
9of the  windfall  gain (loss),  and  to limit  the  increase  (decrease)  in
consumption  expenditures  to the  gerpetuity  eguivalent  of this  windfall.
This  implies  a  large  increase  in  national  saving  during  "good  years." For
example,  assuming  a real  rate  of interest  of five  percent,  the  warranted
increase  in  consumption  is  only  five  percent  of the  present  value  of the
wir.1fall  gain (assuming  an infinite  planning  horizon  so that  the  simple
perpetuity  formula  applies). Conversely,  net  saving  should  be reduced  during
texorarX downturns  in  order  to prevent  unnecessary  sacrifices  in
consumption.
Needless  to say,  the  costs  of incorrectly  assuming  that  shocks  are
temporary  if they,  in fact,  turn  out  to  be permanent  may  be quite  different
than  incorrectly  assuming  that  shocks  are  permanent. This seems  likely,  for
example,  in  countries  that  undertake  a lot  of foreign  borrowing  to sustain
consumption  during  what they  perceive  to  be a temporary  downturn.  If it
becomes  clear  later  that the  downturn  involves  a permanent  reduction  in
income,  adjustment  to the  new  situation  must  occur. The  reduction  in
financial  flexibility  caused  by earlier  borrowing  may,  however,  make  the
necessary  adjustments  more  costly  or risky  to implement.
There  is often  a strong  a griori  presumption  about  the  nature  of
particular  shocks. The  1976-80  coffee  boom  in Colombia,  for  example,  was
widely  believed  to  be a temporary  phenomenon  rather  than  a permanent  one,
being  the  consequence  of a  major  frost  in  Brazil,  the  world's  largest  coffee
exporter. According  to  Jeffrey  Davis  (1983,  p.ll 9), for  example,  "The
increases  in export  receipts  that  resulted  from  this  commodity  price  boom
were substantially  greater  than  might  have  been  expected  from  the  usual
cyclical  movement  of export  prices. At the  same  time,  the  nature  of the
10commodity  markets  and  past experiences  should  clearly  have suggested  the
temporary,  or  windfall,  nature  of the  export  boom."
In the  case  of the  1986  coffee  price  run-up,  analysts  familiar  with  the
crop  damage  in  Brazil  (including  those  at the  World  Bank)  initially  estimated
that  world  coffee  prices  would  remain  above  their  normal  levels  for
approximately  two  years. Estimates  of  both the  magnitude  and  duration  of the
boom  were  subsequently  revised  downward,  as Brazil's  production  capacity
bounced  back --  in  fact,  with a record  crop --  in  1987/88. This  illustrates
that  forecasting  price  movements  and  assessing  the  duration  of  booms  is  a
very  difficult  task indeed.
An alternative  to  market-specific  information  when assessing  the
duration  of  booms is  to use time-series  econometric  techniques.  In
Cuddington  (1986)  and  Cuddington  and  Urzua (1987,  1988), the  problem  of
distinguishing  permanent  and  cyclical  changes  in  key  economic  time  series  for
Colombia  is tackled  using  a technique  developed  recently  by Beveridge  and
Nelson  (1981). Cuddington  (1986)  uses the  technique  to  decompose  the
following  variables:  (i)  the  coffee  terms  of trade,  (ii)  real  export  revenue
from  coffee,  and (iii)  real  GDP  into  permanent  and  cyclical  components.  The
decomposition  of real  GDP  is then  used to  assess  the  rationality  or
"appropriateness"  of  private  and  public-sector  consumption  spending  in
response  to  booms  and  busts. He concludes  that  both the  private  and  public
sectors  tended  to overconsume  during  cyclical  upswings  in  income. He
conjectures  that  this  overspending  may  be the  consequence  of the  relaxation
of credit  constraints  during  booms  in the  case  of private  consumption,  and
lack  of government  budgetary/administrative  control  over  expenditures  in  the
face  of surging  export  revenues  in the  case  of public  consumption.
11The  Cuddington-Urzua  (1988)  paper  stresses  the  fiscal  response  to
booms. Their  findings  indicate  that  Colombian  government  spending  reflected
no countercyclical  tendency  over  the  1951-84  period. Rather  there  was
tendency  for  permanent  increases  in spending  to exceed  permanent  increases  in
national  income  and  government  revenue.  Government  revenue,  on the  other
hand,  did  exhibit  countercyclical  behavior. Because  permanent  increases  in
reve'ue  lagged  the  growth  in  spending,  however,  structural  rather  than
cyclical  fiscal  deficits  became  a  problem  in the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.
(The  regression  results  suggest  that  for  an increase  in  permanent  government
revenue  of  .00  pesos,  government  spending  rose  on average  by 117  pesos  --  a
situation  that  is obviously  unsustainable.]
Cuddington  and  Urzua (1987)  uses the  Beveridge-Nelson  method  to
decompose  price  movements  for  26  primary  commodities  into  permanent  and
cyclical  components. This information  provides  policy  makers  with some
guidance  on the  extent  to  which  expenditures  should  be adjusted,  or
additional  tax  revenues  raised,  in response  to  booms  or  busts.  The cyclical
component  of the  price  movements  for  some  commodities  is  quite  high,  impl;lng
that  they  will ultimately  be teversed,  whereas  for  other  commodities  the
cyclical  component  is small.
Limitations  of the  Permanent  verses  Cyclical  Distinction
Much theoretical  work  as well  as common  policy  prescriptions  for
managing  resource  booms  emphasize  the  distinction  between  "permanent"  and
"temporary" (or  cyclical)  shocks. This  distinction,  for  example,  leads  to
the  well-known  dictum  that  a country  should  "adjust  to  permanent  shocks,  but
finance  (previous  expenditure  levels]  when  facing  temporary  shocks." In
practice,  however,  it is  often  difficult  to tell  which  shocks  are  which. A
12Brazilian  frost  that  reduces  the  country's  export  potential  presumably
creates  only  a temporary  terms  of trade  improvement  for  other  coffee
exporters. If,  however,  the  temporary  production  lull  in Brazil  sets  in
motion  jockeying  for  market  shares  among  exporters  and  a re-negotiation  of
export  quotas  under  the  International  Coffee  Agreement,  it  may  well  have
permanent  effects  on the  export  prospects  of Brazil's  competitors.  As
implied  above  when  discussing  Brazil's  rapid  restoration  of its  export
capacity  fol  jwing  the  1976  frost,  misjudgments  about  the  degree  of
permanence  or temporariness  of shocks  are  all too  common.
In reality,  there  are  virtually  no shocks  that  are  truly  permanent  in
the  sense  that  they  will  prevail,  with  certainty,  into  the  indefinite  future.
Rather  one  must  view the  world  economic  environment  in general,  and  primary
commodity  prices  in  particular,  as stochastic. In the  special  case  where  a
particular  commodity  price  happens  to  follow  a random  walk,  all  changes  in
the  price  should  be viewed  as "permanent"  in the  sense  that  the  current  price
is the  best  predictor  of future  prices. Yet, future  prices  may  be highly
uncertain. Intelligent  policy  responses  to  booms  take  this  uncertainty  into
account. If future  incomes  from  commodity  exports  are  highly  variable  (and
unpredictable),  a high  proportion  of  any  export  windfall  should  be saved.  ll/
This  would,  of course,  be advisable  even if  the  price  change  was deemed  to  be
"permanent"  in the  stochastic  sense  described  above.
An interesting  conclusion  from  Cuddington-Urzaa  (1987)  study  of  primary
commodity  price  behavior  iv that  the  simple  time  series  models  used  to
distinguish  permanent  and temporary  price  shocks  typically  explains  less  than
ll/  This  conclusion  presumes  the  weak  conditions  necessary  to generate
a precautionary  demand  for  saving  are  satisfied.
13fifty  percent  of the  total  variation  in the  underlying  data  series. That  is,
there  is & large  amount  of residual  uncertainty. Commodity  prices  are
inherer.tly  very  difficult  to forecast.  Hence,  recognizint  and  coping  with the
high  degree  of export  price  uncertainty  may  be much  more  imRortant  from  a
Rolicy  standpoint  than  correctly  predicting  the  degree  of  permanence  of  a
Rarticular  grice  shock.
When  price  uncertainty  is  large,  prudent  policy  should,  first,
concentrate  of generating  large  incremental  saving  during  booms  without
worrying  too  much  about  their  d"ration. [The  strategy  of sharply  increasing
saving  is  also the  appropriate  response  for  highly-certain  temporaME  shocks.)
Second,  there  should  be an  emphasis  on flexibility  when  designing  government
expenditure  and  taxation  programs. Programs  that  lock  the  public  sector  into
large,  inflexible,  recurrent  expenditures  or irreversible  or unalterable
investment  projects  during  booms  should  be avoided. This  caveat  is
especially  important  for  projects  undertaken  with  borrowed  funds,  because  the
increased  debt  burden  reduces  financial  flexibility.  These  fiscal  strategies
leave  the  economy  vulnerable  to  the  subsequent  downturns  in prices. Third,
designing  policy  to facilitate  improved  risk  sharing  both  domestically  and
internationally  may  have  a high  payoff.  12/
12/  See  Cuddington  (1986,  Section  V) for  a brief  discussion  of risk  sharing.
14IV.  COUNTRY  EXPERIENCE  WITH  BOOMS
Having  briefly  reviewed  some  of the  key insights  from  the  theory  on
booming  economies  and the  Dutch  Disease  and  assessed  the  difficulty  of
distinguishing  permanent  and  cyclical  shocks,  it is  useful  to  describe  the
typical  experience  of primary  commodity  exporters  during  the  1970s. The
generalizations  reported  below  are  based  on a detailed  study  of the  Colombian
management  of coffee  export  booms  in 1976-80  and  1985-86,  as  wvll  as a less
extensive  comparison  of changes  in  key  macro  variables  before,  during,  and
after  booms in  Cameroon  (petroleum,  coffee),  Colombia  (coffee),  Dominican
Republic  (sugar),  Ghana  (cocoa),  Indonesia  (petroleum),  Jamaica  (bauxite),
Mexico  (petroleum),  Nigeria  (petroleum),  Papua  New  Guinea  (copper),  and
Zambia  (copper).  13/  Particular  attention  was given  to the  role  that  public
sector  activity  had in  stabilizing  or destabilizing  these  economies  during
export  booms  and  busts.
In  practice,  concerns  over the  possibly  adverse  effects  of a commodity
export  boom  have centered  on the  tendency  to  overspend  during  and  following
export  booms,  thereby  considerably  reducing  the  total  realizable  gains  from
the  boom.  This  overspending  may  be the  result  of excessive  increases  in
consumption  spending  by either  the  private  or public  sectors,  or overly
ambitious  and  inefficient  capital  investment  programs.
As explained  above,  it is  natural  for  the  real  exchange  rate to
appreciate  during  booms.  In  many  cases,  however,  a  pronounced  appreciation
13/  See  Cuddington  (1986,  1987,  1988)  and  Cuddington  and  Urzuka  (1988)
on Colombia. A  brief  summary  of the  macroeconomic  effects  of the  1976-80
coffee  boom is  given  in  Appendix  B.  The  underlying  data  used in the  cross-
country  comparative  work are  reported  in the  Tables  in  Appendix  C.
15is  either  undesirable  or  proves  to  be excessive  from  a social  standpoint.
First,  the  exchange  rate  may  be overvalued  at the  onset  of the  boom so that
no further  appreciation  is  called  for  to  restore  equilibrium. This  was a
common  occurrence  in  commodity  exporting  LDCs  in the  1970s. Second,  if there
is  excessive  spending  out  of an  export  windfall  due  to  profligate  government
spending,  for  example.  the  equilibrating  appreciation  of the  real  exchange
rate  will  have to  be greater  than  what  would  be required  under  optimal
expenditure  levels.  This  excessive  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  reduces
profitability  in  the  non-booming  export  sector,  thereby  bringing  about  an
unnecessarily  large  contraction  in the  sector's  output  and  employment.  Third,
this  contraction  of the  lagging  sector  may  also  be deemed  socially
undesirable  if cumulative  development  benefits  from  continuous  production  are
lost  as a result  of [temporary]  production  cutbacks. Finally,  the  monetary
impact  of the  boom  via its  effect  on the  inflow  of foreign  reserves  may  cause
a  temporary  surge  in the  domestic  inflation  rate,  while  the  real  exchange
rate  overshoots  its  equilibrium  level.  14/
Not  only  does  the  exchange  rate  appreciation  often  become  "excessive,"
the  high  value  of the  domestic  currency  persists  long  after  the  boom  has
subsided,  thereby  preventing  re-adjustment  of the  non-booming  tradeable  goods
sector. The  maintenance  of an overvalued  exchange  rate  may  be made  feasible
by the  large  accumulation  of foreign  exchange  reserves  during  the  boom;  this
reduces  the  pressure  on the  central  bank to  bring  about  speedy  depreciation
of the  real  exchange  rate  after  the  boom.  Permanently  higher  levels  of
government  spending  which  are  often  initiated  during  temporary  booms  also
contribute  to  sustained  overvaluation.  The  Nigerian  and  Colombian  experiences
14/  This  point  has  been made  by Sebastian  Edwards  (1985).
16with oil  and  coffee  booms  respectively  in  the  late  1970s  are just  two
instances  where  this  occurred.  15/
In addition  to the  tendencies  to  overspend  and  allow  exchange  rate
overvaluation  to  become  acute  during  booms,  there  are  several  other  common
features  in  booming  economies. The following  pattern  is typical,  but  of
course  the  specifics  vary from  country  to  country:
(1)  Periodic  surges  in exports  lead  to large,  but  often  very short-lived,
trade  surpluses  or even  current  account  surpluses  --  a relatively
unusual  occurrence  in LDCs  --  as well  as overall  balance  of payments
surpluses,  reflecting  a large  inflow  of foreign  exchange  to the  central
bank.
(2)  Imports  respond with a lag  of a year  or two  to the  increased  foreign
exchange  inflow  and  the  associated  rise  in  national  income.  In  many
instances,  the  monetary  authority  responds  to the  massive  inflow  of
foreign  exchange  reserves  by relaxing  quantitative  restrictions  and
other  regulations  governing  imports; most  often  the  import  of capital
goods  and intermediate  inputs  are  given  priority. The increased
availability  of foreign  exchange  and  the  overvaluation  of the  exchange
rate,  particularly  if they  are  perceived  as temporary,  both  contribute
to surging  import  demand.
(3)  Rising  export  prices  cause  a  jump in real  national  incoma  through  two
channels. The first  is  the  well-known  terms  of trade  effect,  which
raises  real income  even in  the  absence  of any  change  in output  volumes.
Second,  there  way  be an impact  on real  GDP, i.e.  real  Ou&2t measured  in
volume  or constant-currency  units.
Thus,  in the  context  of commodity  price  booms,  it  is critical  to distinguish
between  the  impacts  on real income  and  real  output  (GDP). The extent  to
which  real  output  rises  during  an export  boom  depends  on several  factors:
a) the  availability  of idle  capacity  in  the  economy,
b) the  extent  to  which  unemployment  in  the  economy  is  Keynesian
(rather  than  classical  or structural)  in  nature,  as this  determines
whether  an increase  in  aggregate  demand  due to the  spending  effect
of the  boom will  stimulate  output,
c) the  extent  to which  imports  are  allowed  to expand  to meet  the
higher  aggregate  demand. If the  rise  in  exports  is  more  or less
15/  See  Pinto  (1987)  and  Cuddington  (1986)  for  the  case  studies.
17matched  by an increase  in imports,  the  net impact  on aggregate
demand  will  be minimal. In this  case  where  nQ  exports  are
unchanged,  the  export  boom  will  not  succeed  in raising  real  GDP
even  if there  Is  idle  capacity.
d) the  monetary  consequences  of the  boom,  which  will  be taken  up
below.
Empirically,  the  effect  of the  export  price  surge  on real  output  growth
is  often  quite  small  and  short-lived.  MacBean's  (1966)  seminal  work  explored
the  link  between  export  price  shocks  and  national  output  in great  detail
using  both time  series  and  cross-country  analyses  for  a number  of commodity
exporting  LDCs.  He found  very  little  evidence  of a statistically  significant
effect. Later  researchers  have  by and large  concurred  with  MacBean's
findings.  16/  Perusing  the  Tables  for  various  countries  in  Appendix  C, it
indeed  appears  that,  during  most of the  booms  studied,  the  response  of real
GDP  was rather  small. In some  cases,  e.g.  Jamaica  during  both the  1974-5  and
1979-80'  bauxite  price  surges,  GDP growth  actually  turned  negative. It is
certainly  not true,  in general,  that  commodity  price  booms  caused  a surge  in
real  GDP.  The inflation  rate (measured  using  the  GDP  deflator  in the  Tables),
on the  other  hand  does surge  in  almost  every  country  when  a boom  occurred.
Furthermore,  inflation  in the  post-boom  periods  often  remained  high.
The forgoing  evidence  on the  real  output  and  inflation  effects  of  booms
suggests  that  governments  interested  in short  run  stabilization  policy  should
focus  on  the  inflationary  consequences  of the  boom.  Cyclical  fluctuations  in
output  and  employment  are  likely  to  be mild in  most  cases. The monetary,
inflationary  and  exchange  rate  aspects  of  boom  management  are  discussed  in
Section  V below.
16/  See  Krueger  (1984)  for  a recent  survey.
18This  empirical  evidence  may  seem  rather  surprising  given  the  widespread
policy  concern  over the  real  output  and  employment  impacts  of commodity  booms
in  many  developing  countries.  How  can  one  reconcile  the  apparept  concern  of
policy  makers  with the  statistical  insignificance  obtained  by econometric
research? Perhaps  it is  necessary  to distinguish  more  carefully  between
export  booms  caused  by favorable  terms  of trade  shocks  and  those  caused  by
natural  resource  discoveries. One  would  expect  the  impact  on real  GDP  to  be
larger  in the  case  of a resource  discovery,  because  it  shifts  the  country's
production  possibilities  frontier  outward  and leads  to an increase  in  export
vglumes  whereas  a terms  of trade  shock .mpacts  on export  grices. The latter
may  have a significant  effect  on the  allocation  of resources,  i.e.  the
c2moijoti2U  of output  without  having  a large  effect  on total  output.  (It
represents  a movement  along  the  production  frontier  rather  than  an outward
shift  in it.) The  compariscn  below  of Cameroon's  coffee  price  boom  and  oil
discovery  boom in the  1970s  supports  this  conjecture.
As mentioned  above,  the  central  bank's  foreign  reserves  typically  surge
at the  outset  of a boom.  This  has important  monetary  consequences.  Unless
the  monetary  authority  is  equipped  with  effective  mechanisms  for  sterilizing
the  monetary  impact  of this  inflow,  the  domestic  monetary  base,  as  well as
the  broader  monetary  aggregates  will rise  sharply  as the  foreign  exchange
inflow  occurs. Of course,  aggregate  demand  often  increases  sharply  with  an
export  boom even  if  heavy  monetization  of the  foreign  exchange  inflow  does
not  occur.  If the  real  output  (supply)  response  to this  surge  in aggregate
demand  is small,  as is  often  the  case (as  discussed  in the  previous
paragraphs),  then  the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  is felt  primarily  through
its  impact  on the  domestic  inflation  rate.  Indeed  it is typical  for
19inflation  to surge  during  booms.  (Any  increase  in  real  money  demand  is
likely  to  be modest  in  cases  where  the  real  output  growth  is low  and the
inflation  rate  rises.) The  inflationary  impact  of the  boom can  be greatly
exacerbated  by the  stance  of the  monetary  authority. Attempts  to  maintain  a
fixed  nominal  exchange  rate,  particularly  when coupled  with foreign  exchange
regulations  that  force  exporters  to  convert  export  proceeds  into  local
currency  within  a short  period  after  receipt,  generally  lead  to  higher
inflation  relative  to regimes  where  some  upward  adjustment  of the  nominal
exchange  rate is  permitted.  17/
The  boom's  impact  on the  structure  of demand,  including  its  breakdown
into  consumption  and investment  and  its  division  between  private  and  public
expenditures,  depends  on initial  distribution  of windfall  gain.  Here  national
practice  varies  widnly. In countries  that  export  mineral  products  there
seems  to  be a tendency  towards  public  ownership  of resources  in the  booming
sector.  The  petroleum  sectors  in Indonesia,  Mexico,  and  Nigeria  are  examples
of countries  where  public  enterprises  control  the  primary  export  sector. In
the  case of agricultural  commodities,  on the  other  hand,  private  ownership  is
more common,  although  government  involvement  in  setting  producer  prices  is
widespread. By setting  the  level  of producer  prices  relative  to  world  market
prices,  government  policies  affect  how  much  of the  surge  in export  earnings
remains  in the  hands  of  producers  and  how  much is  taxed  away  and
redistributed.  In Colombia,  for  example,  the  powerful  coffee  lobby  insisted
that  the  export  gains  remain  in the  coffee  sector  during  the  1976-80  boom  and
17/  See  Neary  and  van  Wijnbergen  for  a discussion  of fixed  verses
flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  in  coping  with  booms.  See  Cuddington  (1987)
and  Appendix  A for  a  discussion  of the impact  of foreign  exchange  controls  on
boom  management.
20the  1985-86  mini-boom. Through  agreements  between  the  National  Coffee
Federation  and the  central  bank and  national  government,  however,  mechanisms
were  devised  to facilitate  financial  intermediation  of the  windfall  from
coffee  exporters  towards  priority  investment  projects  elsewhere  in the
economy. In  Africa,  the  differing  distribution  of the  coffee  windfall
between  producers  and  the  government  in  Kenya  and  Tanzania  makes  an
interesting  policy  contrast:
In Kenya,  the  coffee  boom  amounted  to a terms  of trade  gain  of
K£339m  (m-million;  1975  prices)  in  the  1976-79  period,  equivalent
to 32 percent  of 1975  gross  domestic  product  (GDP). While  in
Tanzania  the  price  increase  was largely  taxed  away,  in  Kenya  the
producer  price  of  coffee  rose  almost  as much  as the  world  price  so
that  coffee  producers,  predominantly  smallholders,  were the  initial
beneficiaries  of the  boom."  (Bevan,  Collier,  and  Gunning.  1987,
p.491).
Of course,  even in  countries  where  the  government  is  not  a major  initial
recipient  of the  boom income,  its  revenues  from  import  tariffs  as well  as
income  and sales  taxes  will  generally  rise  as  private  spending  increases.
Government  policies  can  have  a profound  impact  on the  ultimate  distribution
of the  windfall,  even  when the  boom income  accrues  initially  to  the  private
sector. As Bevan  et al. (1987,  p.510)  emphasize  in their  study  of Kenya:
On theoretical  grounds  we would  expect  the  use  made  by private
agents  of a temporary  windfall  to  be strongly  influenced  by the
presence  of government  controls  on assets  and international  trade.
Our investigation  of the  Kenyan  coffee  boom  has lent  support  to  the
theoretical  analysis  and  has indicated  that  such  considerations  may
be quantitatively  important. Kenyans  indeed  appear  to  have
attempted  to save  a  high  proportion  of their  windfall  incomes
(around  60  percent),  but their  asset  choices  were  so restricted
that  this  drove  up the  relative  price  of nontradeable  capital
goods.  Similarly,  as their  attempts  to increase  consumption  were
constrained  by import  controls,  there  were short-run
redistributions  in  favor  of domestic  producers  of import-
substitutes. In the  longer  run,  the  skewed  sectoral  allocation  of
windfall  investment  produced  further  powerful  redistributions.
...  Conventional  wisdom  would  imply  that  most  of the  benefits  would
accrue  to coffee  and  tea  growers  since  the  Kenyan  government  chose
21to  pass the  rise in  world  prices  on to  farmers. Yet  our  model
indicates  that  the  effects  of the  boom  depend  critically  not  just
on producer  pricing,  but also  on trade  policy  and  investment
allocation. The  distortions  create  by these  policies  cause  a  very
large  part  of the  total  gain  to  end  up in  urban  rather  than  rural
hands.
The  Effect  of External  Shocks  on the  Public  Sector
We now turn  to  the  budgetary  consequences  of the  boom  and the  policy
response  of the  public  sector. The  analysis  of fiscal  policy  in  commodity-
exporting  countries  might  begin  with three  questions:
1.  To what extent  has the  public  sector  response  to  booms  contributed
to short-run  "instability"  --  where  instability  is  defined  here as
either  internal  and  external  disequilibrium?  Is this  response  a
deliberate  policy  action  or is it the  consequance  of automatic
stabilizers  (or  destabilizers)  in the  economy's  fiscal  structure?
2.  If government  activity  has  been  destabilizing,  how  can fiscal  policy
be modified  so that  the  public  sector  plays  a  positive  rather  than
negative  role  in an  economy  attempting  to maximize  the  potential  gain
from  temporary  export  booms?
3.  Is there  reason  to  believe  that  private  sector  response  to  export
booms  has  been suboptimal? If so,  is there  room  for  active
stabilization  policy  designed  to alter  private  consumption  and/or
inv(stment  behavior? If  not, the  primary  objective  of fiscal  policy
should  be insuring  self-restraint  by the  public  sector  and good
administrative  control  of the  budget  process  so that  the  budget  remains
roughly  in  balance  over  time.
Vito Tanzi  (1986,  p.88)  recently  noted  that  "the  automatic  impact  of
external  shocks  [such  as changes  in  the  terms  of trade,  major  import  prices,
the  cost  or availability  of foreign  capital,  etc.]  on the  fiscal  variables  is
likely  to  be much  more important  in  developing  countries  than  in industrial
countries. At the  same  time  the  ability  of developing  countries  to
neutralize  these  effects,  if  they  wished  to to  so,  is  much  more limited."
Because  the  impact  is  much  more  direct  and  automatic,  it is important  not  to
assume  that  changes  in fiscal  variables  represent  discretionary  policy
22responses  to the  external  shocks. Tanzi  lists  a number  of  reasons  for  the
close  link  between  the  budget  and  the  external  sector  in  LDCs,  among  them  the
high  proportion  of foreign  trade  taxes  in total  revenue. He estimates,
"More  than  50  percent  of the  tax  revenue  of developing  countries  may  be
directly  related  to the  foreign  sector."(p.  89)  Ideally,  one  should
distinguish  endogenous  changes  in  the  government's  tax  revenue  and
expenditure  from  discretionary  decisions  to  change  fiscal  policy  stance.
Tanzi's  point  is that  there  are  major  endogenous  changes  in the  budgetary
situation  in response  to exogenous  shocks.  These  effects  do  not necessarily
act like  automatic  stabilizers;  in fact,  they  may  exacerbate  the
disequilibria  initiated  elsewhere  in the  economy.
Tanzi's  analysis  of the impact  of  higher  export  prices  on  government
revenues  and  expenditures  during  the  1970s  distinguishes  three  different
types  of response  by various  LDCs:
A first  (and  very small)  group  considered  the  increase  as a temporary
windfall  which  would  affect  only  marginally  the  permanent  income  of the
country and  of the  government. These  countries  used the  additional
revenue  to pay  off  foreign  debt  or to  accumulate  foreign  assets  (in  the
form  of foreign  exchange  or in  real  assets). These  assets  could  be
liquidated  in future  years  when foreign  earnings  declined  in  order  to
maintain  the  level  of domestic  spending  on some,  hopefully  permanent,
trend. This  behavior  is an application  of the  permanent  income
hypothesis  of consumption  to the  government.
A second,  and  larger,  group  engaged  in  capital  accumulation  at home  by
expanding  the  level  of  public  investment.  Provided  that  the  investment
has as  high a rate  of return  as  what the  country  could  have received
from  foreign  assets,  that  the  "additional"  investment  spending  is
limited  to the  windfall  income,  and that  this  spending  can  be phased  out
when the  windfall  income  begins  to  disappear,  this  policy  response  can
also  be considered  as a good  one. However,  experience  indicate  that
often  the  requirements  mentioned  above  were  not  met.  Investment  was
often  not as  productive  as it could  have  been  having  been distorted  by
poor  management  and  by political  considerations;  it  was  often  too  large;
and  it  was too  rigid  to  be phased  out  when  needed. These  countries
faced  difficulties  when the  windfall  disappeared  and foreign  financing
23dried  up.  These  changes  would  have required  a quick  reduction  of the
investment  expenditure.
A third  and largest  group  increased  public  spending  by increasing  public
employment,  increasing  the  size  of transfers,  increasing  investment,  and
so on.  In this  particular  situation,  when the  decline  in  foreign
earnings  inevitably  came,  the  countries  were tied  to  patterns  and  levels
of spending  that  were  very  difficult  to change. As long  as foreign
loans  were aveilable,  the  countries  used  this  source  to maintain  the
level  of spending  that  could  not longer  be maintained  with  ordinary
revenue. This reaction  postponed  the  problem  and in  many  cases  made it
worse  by leaving  the  countries  with  huge foreign  debts. When the  crisis
came,  and  the  countries  found  that  they  had to  adjust,  as financing  was
no longer  available,  the  consequences  were  very  serious.
Shocks  that  reduce  public  sector  revenue  are  even  more  difficult  to  deal
with.  In this  case,  the  countries  are  often  unable  to make  up the
revenue  losses  in the  short  run. The  losses  of foreign  trade  taxes
could  in theory  be compensated  by increasing  income  taxes  or taxing
domestically  produced  products. But  income  taxes  take  a  very long  time
to introduce  and  collect,  and their  scope  in LDCs  is limited. For  this
reason,  countries  have  often  been  forced  to rely  on inferior  revenue
sources  such  as inflationary  finance,  regressive  excises,  or the
building  up of arrears.  (pp.  90-91).
Tanzi's  discussion  favors  the  first  and  second  strategies  of the  three
described  above  but give  no guidance  as to  when  each  is  preferred.
Cuddington  (1986,  1987,  1988)  suggests  the  first  strategy  is superior  for
countries  that  do  not impose  foreign  exchange  controls  on capital  inflows  and
outflows  and  do not  face  credit  constraints  (i.e.  binding  country  lending
limits)  in the  world  financial  markets. In this  situation  the  bulk of the
temporary  windfall  should  be saved  and  this  saving  s;.ould  take  the  form  of
increased  holdings  of foreign  assets  and/or  a reduction  in foreign
liabilities.  Relatively  small  amounts  of saving  should  be allocated  to
increased  domestic  capital  formation,  at least  in the  short  run  while  the
boom is  occurring. If the  country  has  binding  capital  controls  or faces
credit  rationing,  on the  other  hand,  the  shadow  domestic  interest  rate  and
the  marginal  productivity  of domestic  ivestment  may  be considerably  greater
24than  the  world interest  rate.  In these  circumstances,  it is  optimal  to
allocate  much  of the  windfall  saving  to  domestic  rather  than  foreign
investment,  although  the  appropriate  timing  of this increased  investment  must
still  be considered. If the  absorptive  capacity  of the  economy  is  limited,
the  optimal  strategy  is to initially  invest  the  windfall  saving  in  foreign
assets  and then  to  gradually  undertake  domestic  capital  formation  at  an
optimal  rate,  recognizing  its  impact  on  aggregate  demand  and  absorptive
capacity.
The  potential  public  expenditure  controls  problems  associated  with  booms
have long  been recognized.  Corden  (1984,  p.359),  for  example,  comments:  "it
might  be argued  that  the  true  Dutch  Disease  in  the  Netherlands  was not  the
adverse  effects  of real  appreciation  but  rather  the  use of Booming  Sector
revenues  for  social  service  levels  which  are  not  sustainable,  but  which  it
has  been  politically  difficult  to  reduce." In a study  of booms  in  sub-
Saharan  Africa,  Anand  Rajaram  (1985)  reaches  similar  conclusions. Not  only
does  he note the  prevalence  of large  increases  in government  spending  during
booms,  he claims  that  much  of the  sharp  appreciation  in real  exchange  rates
is  caused  not  by the  commodity  boom  itself  but  by the  large  increases  in
government  expenditure  which  fall  disproportionately  on  nontraded  goods.
After  studying  the  adjustment  of Nigeria  to the  oil  price  boom  and  of  Kenya,
Cote  dl'voire,  and  other  African  exporters  to the  1976-77  coffee  price  boom,
he presents  the  following  as stylized  facts  (p.3):
(1) A boom in the  price  of an export  commodity  was  the "shock"  that
resulted  in  a dramatic  increase  in foreign  exchange  earnings. Much
of this  windfall  was  collected  by the  government  [in  the  countries
he studied].
(2)  In most  countries  this  windfall  led  to  very large  increases  in
government  spending,  with  a  bias towards  the  non-traded  sector.
This  was  the initial  policy  response.
25(3) The  and  of the  boom  was  marked  by a large  decline  in foreign
exchange  earnings  and  government  revenue. This  constituted  a
second  shock.
(4)  The  policy  response  to this  shock  was  to continue  the  spending
levels  inherited  during  the  boom  period. This  necessarily  meant
large  budget  deficits,  monetary  expansion  and  rising  inflation.
It  might  be noted  that  the  real  exchange  rate  overvaluation  caused  by
increased  government  spending  will  be exacerbated  to the  extent  that  the
public  sector  finances  deficits  by  borrowing  abroad.  (The  capital  inflow
must  be accompanied  by a rise in  the  real  exchange  rate to  effect  the
transfer.)
In light  of these  comments,  the  response  of government  expenditures,
revenues  and  the  deficit  during  boom episodes  shown  in  Appendix  C are
informative.  The following  generalization  emerges. During  booms,  the  ratios
of  both government  spending  and  revenue  to  GDP typically  rise,  with the
expenditure  ratio  growing  more  rapidly  than  the  revenue/GDP  ratio.  Thus,  in
spite  of the  additional  revenue  secured  during  booms,  government  expenditure
increases  quickly  outstripped  the  gain  in  revenue. Booms  are,  therefore,
accompanied  (with  a slight  lag)  by a rise  in the  fiscal  deficit  --  just  the
opposite  of  what one  would  expect  based  on the  consumption  smoothing,  i.e.
permanent  income,  strategy  discussed  above.
As the  booms  subsided,  moreover,  the  fiscal  deficit  often  stays  large,
suggesting  that  booms  may  set in  motion  long-run  fiscal  problems  if  not  well
managed. In short,  the  lack  of fiscal  control  in booming  economies  is  a
malor  2roblem. It  can significantlv  reduce  or even  negate  the  economy's
total  rain from  eommodity  exporr  booms.
26The  remainder  of this  Section  briefly  summarizes  the  experiences  of
Kenya,  Nigeria,  Jamaica,  and  Cameroon  in dealing  with  export  booms  and  busts,
with emphasis  on their  fiscal  policy  responses. The first  three  countries
are  examples  of rather  poor fiscal  management  that  led  to long-term
structural  difficulties.  The  case  of Cameroon  is  one  of adept  and  timely
macroeconomic  management. In addition  to these  cases,  Appendix  B considers
in  greater  detail  Colombia's  1976-80  coffee  boom.  Although  the  policy
response  to the  boom  was  not  without  shortcomings,  Colombia's  experience  must
be viewed  favorably  in comparison  to that  of other  primary  commodity
exporters  that  boomed  in the  19 73s. 18/
Kenya:  The Distribution  of the  Windfall  and Fiscal  Control
The  Kenyan  coffee  boom in the  later  half  of the  19708  illustrates  that
fiscal  control  problems  can  arise  even  when the  initial  windfall  accrues  to
the  private  sector. Kenya  was rather  unusual  in that  farmers  received  the
full  world  price  for  their  coffee,  after  deducting  marketing  and  processing
costs.  Bevan  et al. (1986)  note,  "There  were  no attempts  to sterilize  the
coffee  money  by putting  it in,  for  example,  some  form  of stabilization  fund,
although  the  Central  Bank  argued  for  this  and  also the  IMF  suggested
something  of that  nature. The government,  however,  refused  to take  any  such
actior.  and  decided  to let  all  the  gains  be passed  on to the
farmers...  " (p.32) In spite  of the  fact  that  the  government  was  not a  direct
recipient  of the  coffee  windfall,  its  revenues  from  other  taxes  rose
substantially.  Unfortunately,  this  contributed  to  and  accelerated  the
breakdown  in the  government's  control  over  public  expenditures.  Bevan  el al.
18/  See  Larrecq  (undated)  for  a detailed  analysis  of the  much  more
varied  experiences  of commodity  experters  in  western  Africa.
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.stress  this  political  economy  aspect  of the  budget  process:
[It)  reflected  the  political  difficulty  of  holding  back  expenditures  in
an economy  with  many  obvious  needs,  when it  was  widely  known  that  the
Treasury  had access  to extra  money.  In  an attempt  to  make it  more
difficult  for  the  Treasury  to  cut  down their  requests,  spending
ministries  refused  to rank  projects  in  any  priority. The  Treasury
therefore  had to  enforce  spending  ceilings  on ministries  with little
guidance  about  the  relative  merits  of proposals. Not  only  did  many  bad
projects  thus  come  to  be retained,  but the  net  effect  was for  the
Treasury  to  err  on the  side  of extravagance.  (1986,  p.35).
This lack  of budgetary  control  ultimately  lead  to  an economic  crisis  in  the
early  1980s:
Our interpretation  of the  events...  [is] that  the  coffee  boom  was the
root  cause  of the  1981  crisis,  while  the  crisis  of the  mid-1970s  was a
smaller  adjustment  problem. The  boom led  to a  breakdown  of control  over
public  expenditure,  which  was  not  restored  until  1983. There  was  an
expansion  of the  public  sector  considerably  in  excess  of  what  was
sustainable  under  normal  circumstances,  and  additionally  private  demand
expanded  too  rapidly. The  boom thus  caused  the  serious  disequilibrium
in the  economy. As a result  of the  boom the  government  became  unable  to
handle  its  finances  in  an efficient  and  responsible  way, and  in
consequence  was  unable  to  handle  the  second  oil [import]  price  shock
efficiently.  (Bevan  et al.,  1986,  p.53)
Clearly,  the  Kenyans  suffered  from  the  type  of "Dutch  Disease"  described  by
Corden  above:  an inappropriate  fiscal  response  to  the  boom.  With the  benefit
of hindsight,  the  coffee  boom  of the  1970s  must  be viewed  as a major  missed
opportunity  to accelerate  the  country's  economic  development.
The  Nigerian  ExRerience_
Nigeria  provides  a clear  example  of  heavy  fiscal  dependence  on primary
export  earnings  and the  lack  of expenditure  restraint  accompanying  export
booms.  According  to  Rajaram  (1985,  pp.l5-1 6), "In  the  nine-month  period
before  mid-1974,  Nigerian  government  oil  revenues  almost  quadrupled,  the  rise
being  due to the  oil  price  increase,  increased  production  and  greater  tax,
royalty  and  ownership  shares  in  oi'  revenue. The  balance  of payments  surplus
increased  by a factor  of 20 correspondingly."
28The  government  responded  with a large  expansion  in  non-tradeables
expenditures.  'A  very  large  part  of the  spending  was  on education,  transport
and  communication,  and  construction  (military  barracks,  conference  centers).
The  Udoji  Commission's  recommendations  also  increased  the  public  sector  wage
bill  by almost  60  percent..  .The  income  created  by the  spending  increased
demand  for  food  and  with  domestic  supplies  being  inelastic  in the  short  run
this  quickly  spilled  over  into  imports. Port  and  transport  bottlenecks  were
quickly  reached  and  food  prices  began  rising. Inflation  received  further
impetus  from  the  high level  of government  expenditure  which,  having  ovcrt!  ken
revenue,  had  pushed  the  budget  into  a deficit. The  monetary  expansion  fueled
the  inflationary  spiral."  (Rajaram,  1985,  p.16) As Table  2 shows,  foreign
exchange  reserves  began  to  decline  abruptly  in  1981,  and  the  government
resorted  to large  amounts  of external  borrowing  rather  than  curtailing
expenditures  to sustainable  levels.
Federal  government  oil  revenues,  predominantly  from  the  petroleum
profits  tax,  royalties,  and  the  profits  of the  Nigerian  National  petroleum
Company  averaged  68 percent  of total  federally  retained  revenue  (after
subtracting  revenue  collected  by the  federal  government  and  passed  on to
state  and local  governments  under  revenue  sharing  agreements)  during  1981-86.
The fall  in  world  petroleum  prices  in  the  1980s  has resulted  in  a significant
erosion  of the  revenue  base.  After  a 22 percent  increase  in 1980,  oil
revenue  declined  by 30  percent  in 1981-83. In 1984,  however,  revenues  jumped
30  percent  due to  a sharp  increase  in  production  volume  and the  effect  of
exchange  rate  chpiges.
In  Nigeria,  v  'n  other  primary  commodity  exporting  countries,  the  link
between  exchange  rate  policy  and  government  revenue  is important. When
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is  eroded. In  addition  to limiting  the  naira  value  of petroleum  revenues,
Nigeria's  currency  appreciation  lowered  revenue  from  ad  valorgm  import  duties
and  switched  profits  from  the  relatively  taxable  manufacturing  sector  to  the
untaxed  commercial  and  distribution  sectors. This  caused  federally  collected
revenue  to fall  from  about  25  percent  of  GDP in 1981  to 20 percent  of  GDP  in
1985. The revenue/GDP  ratio  did,  however,  improve  sharply  to 24  percent  in
1986  as a result  of the  substantial  devaluation  experienced  in the  last
quarter  of the  year,  and  efforts  to  widen  the  tax  base.  The sensitivity  of
government  revenue  to the  exchange  rate  suggests  that  countries  that  manage
to  avoid  overvalued  exchange  rates  during  booms  will  have a considerably
easier  time  preventing  fiscal  problems  from  arising. This assumes,  of
course,  that  the  government  succeeds  in limiting  expenditure  if revenlues
remain  intact.
Jamaica: Booms and Economic Stagnation
The  contrast  in  Jamaica's  growth  performance  in the  1960s  compared  to
the  1970s  and  first  half  of the  1980s  is striking. In the  1960s,  the  economy
experienced  positive  growth  in  every  year  except  1963  when it dropped
slightly,  before  surging  ahead  at  a 12.3  percent  rate  in 1964.  In the  1970-
85 period,  on the  other  hand,  real  growth  languished,  dropping  by as much  as
5 or 6  percent  in several  terms. This  stagnation  has  also  been  accompanied
by considerably  higher  rates  of inflation  than  those  prevailing  in the  1960s,
or those  prevailing  in the  industrial  countries  during  the  1970s  for  that
matter.  (See  the  Jamaica  Table  in  Appendix  C.)
The long-run  trend  in  Jamaica's  fiscal  situation  is  equally  unfavorable.
The  ratio  of the  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP  was  generally  2-3  percent  in the
301960..  It  began  to climb  in the  early  1970s:  from  2.7  percent  of  GDP  in 1970,
to rose  to 5.3  % in 1973. As Jamaica's  bauxite  earnings  surged  in the  1974-
75,  the  fiscal  deficit  rose  to 7.9  percent. As the  boom ended,  the  deficit
ballooned  to 15.5  %  of GDP  as a revenues  turned  down  while  expenditures
increased  sharply. As the  Table  shows,  a second  bauxite  boom in  1979-80  did
nothing  to improve  the  fiscal  balance. The  deficit  rose  to 20.8  percent  of
GDP in 1980,  as expenditures  outstripped  the  revenue  gain  associated  with  the
boom.
As we have seen,  during  both  booms,  Jamaica's  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP
ratio  actually  rose  relative  to its  pre-boom  level.  Conventional
stabilization  policy  would  have  dictated  a reduction  not  an increase  in the
deficit  ratio. Clearly,  this  fiscal  policy  stance  during  the  boom and  post-
boom  periods  was anything  but  stabilizing.
It is interesting  to  note that  the  perceived  need for  countercyclical
stabilization  policies  depends  importantly  on whether  one focusses  on real
GDP  growth,  domestic  inflation,  or the  surge  in  export  prices  and  volumes.
As the  summary  data  Table  on the  booms  indicates,  real  GDP growth  droRdS
during  both the  1974-75  and 1979-80  booms.  Inflation,  on the  other  hand,
rose,  particularly  during  the  1974-75  episode  --  presumably  as much  a result
of higher  world  prices  for  imported  oil  as the  bauxite  export  boom.  Thus,  it
is  unclear  what  countercyclical  adjustment  in  fiscal  policy  would  have  been
warranted. What is  clear,  is  that  the  secular  deterioration  in the  country's
fiscal  position  has  been a major  contributor  to the  unsustainable  external
imbalances  currently  plaguing  the  Jamaican  economy.
Thus,  in spite  of two  export  booms  in the  1970s,  Jamaica's  fiscal
position  worsened  dramatically,  as control  over  public  expenditure  waned,  and
31slow  revenue  growth  was accompanied  by heavy  dependence  on foreign  borrowing
by the  public  sector.  This "rachet  effect"  of increased  government  spending
during  booms,  which  proves  difficult  to reduce  once  the  booms  subside  is  all
too  common. In Jamaica,  as in  other  commodity-exporting  countries,  this
flscal  problem  had important  financial  consequences.  Between  1970  and  1980,
Jamaica's  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  long-term  debt  rose  from  30.2%  of
exports  (of  goods  and  services)  and  12.0%  of GDP to  101.2%  of exports  and
60.0%  of GDP.  The  debt  burden  became  even  more  onerous  in  the  early  1980s  as
traditional  export  markets  for  bauxite  and  alumina  faced  dismal  growth
prospects  and the  government  failed  to  correct  growing  fiscal  imbalances  and
a  severely  overvalued  exchange  rate.
When a new  government  came  to  power  in  October  of 1980,  it  attempted  to
reduce  the  role  of the  public  sector  and  create  a policy  environment  more
conducive  to rapid  growth  in the  export  .. r 4 ented  sectors  of the  economy.
Between  1980  and  1985,  however,  the  progress  on this  front  was  minimal.
Management  of the  economy  in  the  face  of greatly  reduced  capital  inflows  from
abroad  and  the  need  for  repeated  rescheduling  of existing  external
obligations  became  the  primary  concern  of policy  makers. Given  the  country's
debt  servicing  burden,  the  fiscal  authorities  had  little  financial  or fiscal
flexibility  to  conduct  countercyclical  stabilization  policy  in the
recessionary  domestic  environment  prevailing  in the  first  half of the  decade.
Furthermore,  even the  narrower  objective  of restoring  fiscal  balance  was  made
considerably  more difficult  by the  debt  overhang  and  the  large,
nondiscretionary  costs  that  debt  servicing  implies  for  the  budget.
32Clmeroon:  i  Came  of Adent  Boom  Management
Cameroon's  experience  with  commodity  export  booms  during  the  1970s  is
interesting  for  a number  of reasons. First,  it  had two  positive  shockb:  a
coffee  price  boom in 1976-77  and  an oil  boont  in 1979-80. (Cameroon  did  not
export  oil  prior  to thac  time.) Second,  while  the  former  was  a price  shock,
the  latter  involved  exploitation  of new  offshore  oil  reserves  beginning  in
1978.  Benefits  of Cameroon's  new  oil  export  capability  were  greatly  enhanced
by the  sharp  run-up  in  world  petroleum  prices  in 1979-80. Finally,
Cameroon"s  management  of these  back-to-back  booms  was exemplary. Largely
through  prudent  fiscal  policy,  it  avoided  many  of the  adverse  consequences  of
booms  experienced  by other  commodity-exporting  countries.
Assessing  Cameroon's  growth  performance  is  difficult  because  of data
accuracy  problems.  19/  The real  GDP  growth  figures  reported  by the  IMF's
Inte2national  Financial  Statistics  differ  considerably  from  those  in  the
World  Bank's  Country  Economic  Memorandum  (CEM),  as the  Table  shows.
Nevertheless,  the  data,  such  as they  are,  suggest  that  real  GDP  growth
drog2e during  the  1976-77  coffee  boom. As explained  above,  it  is  not
uncommon  to see  very little  or no surge  Ln  real  GDP in  response  to a sharp
rise in the  world  price  of a country's  primary  export  commodities.  Although
there  may  be some  reallocation  of resources,  the  overall  level  of capacity
utilization  need  not  be greatly  affected,  particularly  if  the  economy  is  near
full  employment  or if  unemployment  is  structural  in  nature. Hence,  although
national  income  rises,  real  domestic  product  mnay  show  little  change.
In contrast,  the  1979-80  boom initiated  by the  expansion  in  oil
19/  These  problems  are  discussed  in  Cameroon:Countrv  Economic
Memorsndum.  The  World  Bank,  Report  No.6395-CM,  February  19,  1987.
33production  capacity  apparently  caused  a sharp  increase  in  real  GDP.  The  CEM
data (which  I suspect  are  superior)  indicate  an increase  in  real  CDP,  rising
from  2.9  in 1975-78  to 14.9  percent  during  1979-80  and then  falling  to 7.3
percent  in 1981-83  as  world  oil  prices  declined  from  their  peak.
A comparison  of Cameroon's  two  boom  episodes  supports  the  conjecture
above  that  commodity  orice  booms,  compared  to  booms  caused  by exogenous
volume  increases,  often  have  only  modest  impacts  on real  output. In the  face
of  price  or "terms  of trade"  shocks,  therefore,  stabilization  Rolicies  should
focus  on the  inflationary  and  external  balance  consequences  of booms  rather
than  their  effects  on output  and  emplovment. In  the  case  of  booms  caused  by
resource  discoveries,  on the  other  hand,  more  emphasis  on t..e  latter  effects
is warranted.
In their  comparative  study  of boom  management  in  Cameroon,  Cote
d'Ivoire,  and Senegal,  Devarajan  and  DeMelo  (1987)  conclude  that  Cameroon's
macro  management  during  the  1970s  was  first-rate.  The increase  in  spending
associated  with the  boom  was  modest;  the  government  budgetary  situation  which
was  conservative  prior  to the  booms  remained  so  throughout  the  1970s;  the
real  exchange  rate  did  not  appreciate  sharply,  in  contrast  to the  typical
pattern  in  booming  economies  (including  Cote  d'lvoire  and  Senegal). They
point  out that  the initial  windfall  from  the  coffee  boom  in  Cameroon  and the
windfall  from  the  coffee  and  cocoa  boom in  Cote  d'Ivoire  accrued  to their
commodity  stabilization  funds,  as  prices  paid to  domestic  producers  were  kept
below  prevailing  world  prices. Whether  this  results  in  a moderation  of the
spending  effect  of the  boom (relative  to  a situation  where  the  bulk of the
windfall  accrues  directly  to the  private  sector,  as happened  for  example  in
the  case  of the  1973  phosphate  boom in Senegal)  depends  critically  on  how the
34public  sector  uses the  additional  resources. In  Cameroon,  current
expend'ture  by th.  government  was  restrained  so that  substantial  public
saving  occurred,  and  a large  fraction  of the  windfall  was  invested  in
domestic  capital  formation  thereby  minimizing  the  need  to  borrow  abroad.
According  to Devarajan  and  DeMelo  (1987,  p.  451),
The  post-1978  oil  boom  was  of much  greater  significance  but
elicited  a similar  response. While  estimates  vary,  there  is reason
to believe  that  up to three-fourths  of the  oil  revenues  were saved
abroad...  In fact,  the  government  has  used the  oil  revenues  to
retire  a small  part  of its  foreign  debt.  Consequently,  in contrast
to  other  oil  exporters'  experiences,  Cameroon's  real  exchange  rate
continued  to  depreciate...  in the  first  few  years  oi the  oil  era
(see  [their)  figure  1).  To the  extent  that  this  windfall  was  spent
domestically,  it was  channeled  into  investment  rather  than
consumption;  while the  share  of  public  expenditure  in  GDP fell
slightly  between  1978  and  1982,  that  of public  investment  almost
doubled.
In fact,  capital  expenditure  grew  fourfold  between  1978  and  1981  but then
ceased  to  grow in real  terms,  the  authorities  having  recognis..d  the
constraints  on their  capacity  to  absorb  efficiently  investment  at these
levels.
The fact  that  Cameroon  was  able to  prevent  the  sharp  currency
appreciation  that  typifies  commodity  export  booms  is  especially  noteworthy
because  the  country  has  a fixed  exchange  rate,  being  a member  of the  CFA
zone.  Gradual  real  depreciation  occurred,  implying  that  internal  prices  of
tradeables  were rising  or nontradeables  prices  were falling. Our data  Table
indicates  that  Cameroon's  inflation  rate  dropped  slightly  during  the  1979-80
boom,  although  it  rose  sharply  in the  post-boom  period. This suggests  that
prices  of nontradeables  were  probably  rising,  but  at a  slower  rate  than
tradeables  prices  and,  hence,  the  overall  price  level. Regarding  tradeables
prices,  the  government  used some  of its  liquid  assets  resul-ing  from  the  oil
bonanza  to raise  producer  prices  of  cash  crops,  keeping  the  real  exchange
35Figue  1  (continued)
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Although  government  revenues  in  Cameroon  reflect  royalties  and taxes  on
the  four  oil  companies  operating  in  the  country,  the  government's  revenue
from  the  sharing  of production  is  channeled  into  extra-budget  accounts. The
total  amount  of these  revenues  is  not  divulged. While  this  secrecy  has
potentially  dubious  effects  on the  responsibility  and  accountability  for
public  revenues,  it does  presumably  have the  benefit  of reducing  various
pressures  to increase  government  spending,  which  emerge  once it  becomes  clear
that  the  government  is flush  with funds. (This  was, for  example,  a major
problem  in  Nigeria,  where  there  was a  complete  breakdown  in the  budgetary
control  process  as the  oil  revenue  flowed  in.)
In spite  of the  overall  success  of its  policies,  there  are  a  couple  of
areas  where  Cameroon's  public  expenditure  response  to  the  oil  boom  has  been
less  than  ideal. Over the  1979-85  period,  current  expenditures  rose  in
tandem  with total  government  receipts. There  was  a particularly  sharp  rise
in  "subsidies  and  transfers,"  made  up in large  part  of operating  subsidies  to
the  public  enterprises,  many  of which  are  inefficiently  run  and  generate
losses. Another  source  of concern  is  the  rapid  increase  in the  number  of
permanent  civil  servants,  presaging  a  heavy  burden  for  the  future  as oil
revenues  decline. The issue  here is  how  to  maintain  flexibility  of current
expenditures  so that  they  can  be adjusted  as the  export  environment  changes.
(This  point  was  discussed  in  Section  III  in the  context  of distinguishing
permanent  and temporary  shocks.]
36V. APPROPRIATE  POLICY  RESPONSES  l/
The review  of  country  experiences  above  gives  considerable  insight
into  the  types  of  policy  responses  that  stabilized  rather  than  destabilized
commodity  exporting  LDCs  facing  terms  of trade  shocks. Nevertheless,  it  may
be helpful  to consolidate  the  findings  in the  form  of  more general  lessons  or
principles  involved  in  boom  management.  That is  the  purpose  of this  Section.
When discussing  primary  export  booms,  it is  helpful  to consider  the
appropriate  response  for  the  economy  as a  whole,  before  highlighting  the
possible  roles  of the  private  and  public  sectors. At this level  of
aggregation,  macroeconomic  policies  should  be designed  to  achieve  three  broad
objegtiDvel:
(i)  limiting  increases  in consumption  expenditures,
(ii)  allocating  the  resulting  increase  in  domestic  saving
efficiently  among  alternative  uses including:  increases
in  official  reserves  and  other  foreign  assets,  reductions
in foreign  liabilities,  increases  in  domestic  capital
investment,  and  supporting  programs  in trade,  financial,
and exchange  rate  liberalization,
(iii)  coping  with the  monetary,  inflationary,  and  exchange  rate
aspects  of the  booms.
At the  more disaggregated  level,  three  additional  sectoral  obiectives  should
be addressed:
(iv)  improving  the  sectoral  allocation  and  timing  of domestic
investment,
(v)  maintaining  a reasonable  "balance"  between  the  public  and
private  sectors  of the  economy,
(vi)  setting  producer  prices  (relative  to  world  prices)  to
achieve  an efficient  production  response,  on one  hand,
and  appropriate  levels  of saving  by commodity
/  This section  is adapted  from  Cuddington  (1988).
37The  discussion  below  follows  the  list  of broad  macro  objectives  above,  with
the sectoral  objectives  interspersed  at the  appropriate  points.
Limiting  Increases  in  Consumption  Expenditure
A top  priority  during  temporary  export  booms  is  to prevent  excessive
increases  in  consumption  expenditures,  thereby  sustaining  higher  consumption
after  the  boom subsides. Based  on the  principle  of consumption  smoothing,
which is  welfare-increasing  as long  as there  is diminishing  marginal  utility
of consumption  at the  aggregate  and  intertemporal  levels,  the  correct  policy
is to insure  that  a large  fraction  of the  windfall  is saved  rather  than
consumed. This principle  is  worth  emphasizing  because  excessive  increases  in
current  spending  have  been  the  typical  experience  in  most  developing  countries
during  booms.
It is  not  uncommon  for  total  (private  and  public)  consumption  as a
percent  of GDP to  dip  briefly  but  then  rise  sharply  as the  boom  matures  and
subsides.2/  Parenthetically,  the  finding  that  the  consumption  to  GDP  ratio
falls  during  a boom is  not  proof  that  the  consumption  response  is
appropriate. After  all,  the  cons'umption  to GDP  ratio  will fall  following  a
surge  in income  as long  as the  marginal  propensity  to consume  is less  that  the
average  propensity. If the  rise  in income  is temporary,  the  optimal  marginal
propensity  to consume  should  be much  less  than  the  average  propensity,  causing
a large  drop in  the  consumption  ratio. In Colombia,  for  example,  the
consumption  ratio,  which  hovered  around  80 percent  prior  to the  boom,  dropped
briefly  to 78 percent  at the  peak  of the  boom in 1977,  but then  rose  steadily
2/  Public  consumption  refers  to expenditures  on  currently  produced  goods
and  services  which  do not  constitute  additions  to the  public  sector's  capital
stock.
38to 84 percent  in  1982  --  4 percentage  points  above  its  pre-boom  level. It  was
83 percent  in  1983,  and then  fell  gradually  thereafter  as the  country  headed
into  a growth  recession. A detailed  analysis  of the  response  of consumption
to temporary,  as opposed  to  permanent,  changes  in  CDP indicates  that  both
private  and  public  consumption  in  Colombia  increased  by more than  sustainable
levels  during  the  coffee  boom  of the  1976-80  period. (See  Cuddington
(1986)). This  increase  in  consumption  above  sustainable  levels  necessarily
implies  levels  of consumption  at some  point  in the  future.
How cani  policy  makers  determine  whether  or  not increases  in  consumption
expenditure  are  excessive? To determine  whether  overconsumption  is,  in fact,
occurring  during  booms,  it  is  natural  to assume  that  the  ultimate  objective  of
policy  makers  is  to  maximize  an intertemporal  welfare  function  that  depends  on
aggregate  private  and  public  consumption  in  each  period:
U  u(Ct,Gt)
t=O
Under  the  assumption  that  there  is  diminishing  marginal  utility  of private
consumption  as well  as public  consumption  at the  aggregate  level,  efforts  to
smooth  consumption  intertemporally  in the  face  of income  shocks,  such  as those
caused  by terms  of trade  shocks,  will  be welfare  improving. Suppose  one  makes
the  additional  assumptions  that  (i)  the  demands  for  private  and  public
consumption  each  have  a unity  income  elasticity  of  demand 3 / and (ii)  the
relative  price  (opportunity  cost)  of publicly  provided  goods  in  terms  of
3/  The  Please  Effect,  of course,  claims  otherwise. It  hypothesizes  that
the  public  sector  share  in  GDP  tends  to  rise  as per  capita  income  rises,
implying  that  a corresponding  fall  in the  private  consumption  ratio.
39private  goods  remains  roughly  constant  over  time (independent  of whether  booms
or busts  are  occurring).  With these  additional  assumptions,  welfare  is
maximized  by  a strategy  that  not  only  smooths  private  and public  consumption
intertemporally,  but  also  keeps  their  respective  shares  of GN)P  roughly
constant  during  temporary  export  booms  or busts.41 If  one sees  a sharp
increase  or  decrease  in  the  public  consumption  share,  after  accounting  for  any
countercyclical  stabilization  policy  that  may  be warranted  (which,  by the  way,
would  tend  to  reduce  --  not  increase  --  government  spending),  there  is  a
strong  a priori  presumption  that  the  increase  in  public  consumption  is
excessive.
The  pattern  of public  and private  in  Colombia  before,  during,  and  after
the  1976-80  coffee  boom  provides  a striking  example. The share  of central
government  consumption  rose  sharply  from  8 percent  in 1977,  the  peak  of the
boom,  to almost  12 percent  by 1983.  (Because  these  figures  refer  only  to the
central  government,  they  do not include  increases  in public  consumption).
Even  as the  boom  subsided,  the ratio  of government  consumption).  Even  as the
boom  subsided,  the  ratio  of government  consumption  to  GDP continued  to rise.
This  phenomenon  is  not  unique  to  Colombia. Rajaram's  1985  study  of
Sub-Saharan  africa  finds  a similar  pattern:  government  expenditures  surge
during  booms,  and  are  very  difficult  to  cut  back  after  the  export  boom  ends.
4/  This  point  has  been  emphasized  in  Cuddington  (1986)  where  it is
argued  that  the  difficult  political  economy  question  of the  "appropriate"  size
for  the  public  sector  should  be kept  distinct  from  the  question  of how  to
manage  temporarry  export  booms. During  booms,  the  argument  in the  text
suggests  that  the  relative  shares  of the  private  and  public  sector  in  total
consumption  should  be  held roughly  constant. A massive  expansion  in  the
public  sector,  which  often  occurs  during  booms,  should  be considered
undersirable.  It is self-delusion  to justify  it  on the  grounds  that  the  size
of the  public  sector  was in fact  too  small  prior  to the  onset  of the  boom.
40Assuming  consumption  smoothing  is a desirable  social  objective,  the
question  arises  whether  there  is a role  for  government  policies  in
facilitating  consumption  smoothing  by the  private  sector  or whether  the
private  sector  is  able  to achieve  an  optimum  intertemporal  allocation  of
consumption  on its  own.  In the  latter  case,  the  sole  role  of the  government
would  be to insure  that  its  own  consumption  expenditure  decisions  were  optimal
from  a social  standpoint.
Given  the  widespread  problem  of expenditure  control  by the  public  sector
during  booms,  the  potential  for  active  stabilization  policy  of the  aggregate
demand  management  variety  may  be rather  limited  in  most commodity-exporting
LDCs.  It should  be emphasized,  however,  that  if expenditure  controls  can  be
achieved,  the  automatic  stabilizers  in  the  tax  and  transfer  system  will
sometimes  be adequate  to  prevent  excessive  increases  in  aggregate  demand
following  a run-up  in  export  earnings. If automatic  stabilizers  are
insufficient,  steps  might  be taken  to improve  the  buoyancy  of the  tax  system,
thereby  increasing  the  efficacy  of automatic  stabilizers.
The  case for  policy  intervention  to stabilize  or smooth  private
consumption  is  greatly  strengthened  in situations  where  (i)  the  government
itself  has  demonstrated  good  expenditure  control  during  boom  periods,  acting
at least  neutrally  if not  countercyclically  and (ii)  the  private  consumption
behavior  deviates  from  the  predicted  by the  permanent  income  hypothesis,  it is
much  more difficult  to  make the  case that  government  intervention  will  be
welfare  improving.5/
5/  Weissenberger  (1986)  and  Cuddington  (1986)  elaborate  on this  point.
41To determine  sustainable  levels  of consumption,  the  permanent  income
theory  serves  as  a useful  benchmark. This theory  gives  rise  to the  following
simple  rule-of-thumb:
limit  the  increase  in  national  consumption  expenditure  to the
perpetuity-equivalent  of the  windall  gain 6/
Technically,  this  benchmark  is  only  appropriate  for  countries  that  do  not face
quantitative  limits  on credit  in  the  international  capital  markets,  as was
true  in  Colombia,  for  example,  during  the  1976-80  coffee  export  boom.
Modification  of the  rule  for  countries  facing  foreign  borrowing  constraints
and  domestic  credit  rationing  is briefly  discussed  below.
Using  the  perpetuity  rule,  it is straightforward  to calculate  the
sustainable  increase  in consumption  resulting  from  the  boom.  First,  estimate
the  duration  of the  boom,  the  year-by-year  increase  in export  revenue,  and the
resulting  increase  in  real  GDP (taking  into  account  any  multiplier  effects,
which  depend  on the  level  of idle  capacity  and  unemployment).  This should  be
done  with reference  to  a "no-boom"  scenario  to avoid  the  error  of attributing
entire  growth  in these  variables  to the  boom.  Second,  calculate  the  present
value  of the  increment  in  nominal  income  using  a (nominal)  discount  rate  of,
say,  10 percent. Third,  calculate  the  perpetuity  equivalent  of this  windfall
gain,  which  is just  the  gain in  present  value  terms  multiplied  by the  interest
rate.  Fourth,  take  appropriate  action  to limit  current  consumption  spending
6/  One  might  argue  that  the  relevant  horizon  is  not infinite,  in  which
case  the  rule  would  be an annuity-equivalent  consumption  level  where  the
maturity  of the  annuity  is equal  to the  chosen  planning  or  welfare-analysis
horizon. When the  discount  is in the  10-12  percent  range,  the  distinction
between  a perpetuity  rule  and  an annuity  is likely  to  be small  unless  one
considers  very short  horizons.
42by the  government  and  the  private  sector  to these  sustainable  levels.
Instruments  for  doing  this  are  discussed  below.  If  consumptior  spending  is
allowed  to  rise  above  this  level,  the  cost  will  be reduced  consumption  in
future  periods.
The  rule  of thumb  implies  that  roughly  90 percent  of the  additional
income  from  a temporary  boom should  be save  --  much  higher  than  the  actual
increase  in saving  achieved  by most  countries  in practice. The purpose  of the
above  calculations  is to stress  this  aspect  of export  boom  management.
The discussion  above  refers  to  countries  that  are  not  credit  constrained
in international  markets.7' The  perpetuity  ruale  for  consumption  expenditure
is  only slightly  modified  if  domestic  firms  are  subject  to  borrowing
constraints  but  households  are  not  credit  constrained,  or if  the  country  faces
limited  access  to the  international  credit  markets. What  is relevant  is  not
the  existence  of limits  on international  credit  availability  but  the  extent  to
which  they  are  relaxed  as  a result  of the  boom.  Endogenous  changes  in
domestic  interest  rates  (if  they  are  market-determined  rather  than
administered)  will  also  affect  the  simple  perpetuity  rule  to the  extent  that
intertemporal  substitution  effects  in consumption  are  important  --  a point  of
contention  even  in industrial  countries  where  more  research  on the  issue  has
been  carried  out.
7/  One  might  reasonably  ask: for  how  many countries  is this  relevant
today? After  lengthy  negotiations  with  foreign  commercial  banks,  Colombia
received  a $1  billion  jumbo  loan  in  December  1985.  In  July 1987,  an
additional  $1.06  billion  commercial  bank  loan  was  arranged. (Wall  Street
Journal,  July  21, 1987,  p.28).  The  prolonged  nature  of these  discussions  with
the  commercial  banks  implies  the  Colombia  should  probably  be characterized  as
moderately  credit  restrained  at present. In  contrast,  many  of the  African
coffee  exporters  have  been severely  credit  constrained  during  the  mid 1980s.
43The  Distribution  of Boom  Income  and  its  Effect  on Spending
As application  of the  perpetuity  rule  --  or ir  many  cases  even  casual
empiricism  --  readily  indicates,  excessive  increases  in  domestic  consumption
following  commodity  export  booms  are  common. The  relative  contribution  of the
private  and  public  sectors  to this  overspending  must  be assessed  before
appropriate  policies  can  be devised. It  varies  from  country  to  country  and is
undoubtedly  affected  by the  distribution  of the  windfall  gains  between  the
private  and  public  sectors. The  distribution  of the  windfall  gain  depends,  in
turn,  on:  (i)  the  domestic  tax  system,  including  the  existence  of export
taxes,  any  surcharges  during  booms,  and  the  buoyancy  of other  taxes  as
domestic  inflation  and/or  national  income  rise,  and  (ii)  domestic  pricing
policy. The latter  may  keep  producer  prices  considerably  below  world  prices;
it  may  also  provide  significant  subsidies  to domestic  consumers.8/
Often  the  government  or the  public  sector  at large  is the  primary  source
of overspending;  government  spending  is quick  to respond  to increased  revenue
during  the  boom,  but  extremely  difficult  to  cut  back  once  the  boom
subsidies. In the  presence  of this  "ratchet  effect,"  any  tendency  by the
public  sector  to overspend  is exacerbated  by taxation  policies  that
redistribute  windfall  gains  towards  the  government  and  away  from  the  private
sector. In short,  the  merits  of  countercyclical  changes  in  commodity  export
taxes  depend  critically  on  whether  the  government  sector's  marginal  propensity
to spend  on current  consumption  is  less  than  the  private  sector's  marginal
8/  This  discussion  presumes  that  the  booming  sector  is  privately,  not
publicly,  owned. While  this  is  the  case  for  Columbia's  coffee  sector,  a boom
in the  oil  sector  would  have  a very  different  distribution  of windfall  gains
because  the  resources  are  owned  and  extracted  by a  government  entity  (with
participation  by foreign  multinationals).
44propensity  to consume. Of course,  higher  taxes  also  reduce  production
incentives.  Whether  this  is  desirable  depends  on the  direction  of the  bias
caused  by other  distortions  that  impact  private  supply,  e.g.  subsidized  inputs
such  as fertilizer  in  the  agricultural  sector. many  LDCs  bave  policies  that
discriminate  strongly  against  the  agricultural  sector.  91  However,  marketing
agreements  at the  national  and international  levels  may  work  in the  other
direction:  by supporting  domestic  producer  prices,  they  artificially
stimulating  production.  This  has  certainly  been  the  case  for  the
International  Coffee  Agreement  and  coffee  production  in  Colombia,  whose
inventories  of unsalable  coffee  (because  of export  quotas  under  the  ICA)
reached  100  percent  of  annual  production  in 1983-4.
If the  government  sector  is the  primary  contributor  to overconsumption
during  and  following  booms,  the  needed  policy  response  must  focus  on tighter
control  of public  expenditure. In practice,  improvement  in fiscal  control  may
be more  difficult  to  achieve  if the  boom-induced  increases  in tax  revenue  are
large.1°1 This suggests  that  temporary  export  surcharges  during  booms  (or
equivalently  a widening  gap  between  world  prices  and  the  prices  passed  on to
domestic  producers  through  commodity  stabilization  boards)  are ill-advised
unless  there  is  reasonable  confidence  that  the  government  will  generate  the
needed  increase  in fiscal  saving  by restraining  expenditure.
If  the  private  sector  (including  the  booming  sector)  is  also
contributing  to overconsumption,  the  role  of the  government  policy  becomes
more  complex. The  appropriate  role  depends  crucially  on  why  private
overconsumption  is  occurring. Deviations  from  the  degree  of consumption
9/  See  the  World  Development  Report  1986.
45smoothing  implied  by the  permanent  income  theory  may  be due to  mjo,ia  (i.e.
the  lack  of rational  expectations)  or poor  information  regarding  expected
world  commodity  prices  and  future  incomes,  or domestic  oricing  2olicies  that
distort  growers  consumption  and  investment  decisions. These  imperfections,
which  cause  the  private-sector  response  to the  boom to  be suboptimal,  are
viewed  by some  governments  as  justification  for  policy  intervention  to smooth
private  consumption,  i.e.  for  countercyclical  stabilization  policies.
Noninterventionists,  on the  other  hand,  would  prefer  to improve  the
dissemination  and  processing  of information  by the  private  sector,  and  other
reforms  to improve  the  functioning  of the  market  mechanism.
The  highly  idealized  situation  where  either  countercyclical
stabilization  policy  as well  as institutional  and  structural  reform  become
unnecessary  because  the  private  sector  responds  efficiently  is  scarcely
approximated  in  most developing  countries. These  countries  have  a  wide  range
of  policies  --  some  of them  highly  distortionary  --  that  affect  the  producer
incentives  and  incomes,  including  export  taxes,  domestic  stabilization  funds
and  marketing  boards,  international  commodity  export  agreements,  subsidized
inputs  (such  as fertilizer  and  imported  capital  equipment)  and  preferential
credit  arrangements.  11  Furthermore,  imperfect  credit  markets  place  severe
restrictions  on the  feasibility  of borrowing  against  highly  uncertain  future
income. The  domestic  financial  system  also  fails,  in  many  cases,  to  allocate
loanable  funds  to the  investments  where  true  economic  returns  are  greatest.
The  presence  of relatively  primitive  financial  markets  is  an important
reason  why  private  consumption  increases  sharply  during  booms  and falls  more
ll/  A detailed  discussion  and  critique  of these  institutional
arrangements  affecting  agriculture  can  be found  in the  World  Develonment
Regort  1986.  See  especially  Chapters  4 and  5.
46during  cyclical  downiturns  than  the  permanent  income  theory  would  predict. It
may also  distort  the  allocation  of  any increased  saving  that  does,  in  fact,
occur. For  example,  the  limited  menu  of financial  assets  may  cause  income
recipients  in the  booming  sector  to  overlook  many  high-return  investments  in
the  rest  of the  economy  when investing  their  windfalls. As a  result,  they
may  overinvest  in  the  booming  sector. This  tendency  can,  of course,  be
greatly  exacerbated  if domestic  producer  prices  are  kept  artificially  high  by
government  policy. In this  situation,  both  the  ineffiziency  of investment
(if  it  goes into  the  booming  sector  rather  than  superior  investments
elsewhere)  and  the  distortions  to  private  consumption  (caused  by inadequate
access  to  consumption  loans)  reduce  the  gain in  welfare  from  export  booms.
Financial  reform  pays  high dividends  in such  economies  by increasing  their
capability  to interme(Late  the  increased  saving  during  booms  and facilitating
borrowing  to  smooth  consumption  during  busts. In short,  a  well-functioning
financial  system  increases  the  flexibility  and  resilience  of the  economy,  and
hence its  ability  to cope  with commodity  booms  and  busts --  without  the  need
for  ad hoe intervention.  Hence,  long-run  financial  development  is
particularly  important  in  countries  experiencing  periodic  commodity  market
booms  and  busts.
Even  with a reasonably  sophisticated  financial  system  in  place,
traditional  countercycli_cal  stabilization  measures  by the  monetary  and  fiscal
authorities  will typically  be necessary  if the  potential  gains  from  the
export  boom are  to  be maximized. Monetary  policy  will  be discussed  below.
Returning  for  the  moment  to  fiscal  measures,  one  might  contemplate  cyclical
reductions  in  public  expenditures  and/or  increases  in revenues  via  higher
export  taxes,  for  example.
47Producer  Prices  and  Commodity  Stabilization  Funds
It is common  for  policy  makers  to adjust  the  ratio  of the  producer  price
to the  world  price  downward  during  boom  periods  and  to raise  it somewhat
during  slumps  by levying  a surcharge  on  booming-sector  exports  during  booms.
2./ The  measure  may  be viewed  as a revenue-raising  exRedient  or a
countercyclical  stabilization  device,  although  it  also  affects  long-run
producer  incentives.  The  efficacy  of an export  surcharge  as a
countercyclical  stabilization  device  depends,  as emphasized  above,  on the
government's  marginal  propensity  to  spend  out  of in.reased  export  (tax)
revenue  being  less  than  that  of private  producers  in  the  booming  sector. If
the  government  saves  the  bulk  of the  additional  revenues,  thereby  reducing
its  fiscal  deficit,  the  effect  on aggregate  demand  will  be stabilizing. Bv
using  the  surplus  to reduce  its  net credit  from  the  central  bank,  the
government  can  also  reduce  the  monetary  impact  of the  export  boom.  (The
monetary  impact  of booms  is  taken  up below.) On the  other  hand,  if the
additional  export  tax  revenue  leads  to  large  increases  in government
consumption  spending,  as it  so often  does  in  booming  economies,  the  export
surcharge  may  be counterproductive  from  a  macroeconomic  stabilization
standpoint.
In general,  the  adverse  effect  of,export  surcharge  on producer
incentives  cannot  be ignored. By taxing  away  a  portion  of the  export  revenue
in  good  years,  the  government  reduces  the  expected  return  from  boom-sector
12/  See  Bevan,  Collier,  and  Gunning  (1986)  for  an interesting  study
comparing  the  effects  of the  1976-78  coffee  boom in  Kenya  and  Tanzania. As
the  authors  emphasize,  "Kenya  passed  the  price  increase  on to  coffee  growers,
imposing a coffee  tax  only  after  the  boom  was already  over  and then  only  at a
very low  rate.  In  Tanzania  coffee  was taxed  so  heavily  that  coffee  growers
experienced  only  a  minor  terms  of trade  gain,  most  of the  boom income  accruing
directly  to the  government."  (Chapter  8,  p. 457).
48production  unless,  of course,  prodl'cers  are  confident  that  the  government
will supplement  their  income  by an  equivalent  amount  (via  price  support
programs,  for  example)  during  slumps. The  credibility  of such  a  price
stabilization  policy  is  likely  to  be much greater,  however,  if it is
implemented  by a  commodity  stabilization  fund  that  is  privately  controlled  or
at least  separate  and  distinct  from  the  government  budget  process.  1U  As
long  as growers  believe  that  the  government's  countercyclical  export  tax-and-
subsidy  scheme  is a  positive  generator  of government  revenue  over  the
commodity  cycle,  their  incentive  to  produce  boom-sector  output  decreases.
In  sum,  although  both  price  stabilization  funds  and  export  surcharges
keep  domestic  producer  prices  below  world  prices  during  booms,  surcharges
often  redistribute  income  away  from  producers  towards  the  public  sector.  1iX
Private  stabilization  funds  can, in  principle,  retain  the  windfall  gains  for
producers  while  at the  same  time  inducing  the  coffee  sector,  via the  fund,  to
save  during  booms.
The  Allocation  of Increased  Saving
The  next issue  involves  the  allocation  of the  additional  national  saving
that  should  be generated  during  booms. The  options  available  to  policy
makers  will  depend  on the initial  distrtbution  of the  windfall  among  the
private  sector,  commodity  marketing  boards,  and  the  government,  as  well  as
the  efficacy  of the  financial  system  in intermediating  between  sectors  that
have  net saving  and  those  that  do not.
13/  Colombian  experience  suggests  that  autonomy  of national  stabilization
funds  is  extremely  difficult  to  achieve  in  practice,  even  if the  entity  is
owned  and  controlled  by the  growers  themselves.
14/  Tanzania's  experience  during  the  1976-78  coffee  boom provides  an
excellent  example  of large  redistribution  towards  the  public  sector  that
resulted  in  a surge  in  public  spending.
49The  decision  of how to  allocate  these  savings  should  be guided  by the
principle  that  the  interest  rate  on foreign  borrowing  represents  the
appropriate  opportunity  cost.  1V/  A higher  rate  is  appropriate  in  the
presence  of a foreign  borrowing  constraint. It is  essential  that  appropriate
opportunity  cost  calculations  and  benefit/cost  techniques  be employed  when
choosing  among  alternative  uses  of domestic  sarings  or foreign  resources.
During  booms,  countries'  cost  of external  borrowing  may  drop temporarily.
Care  should  be taken  to insure  that  investment  decisions  are  not  based  on the
assumption  that  the  cost  of capital  will remain  low  for  the  duration  of long-
gestation  investment  projects. It is  more  prudent  to assume  that  the  cost  of
borrowing  will return  gradually  to its  historic  norm  as the  boom  subsides.
Several  uses  of the  additional  saving  should  be considered,  with the
allocation  of saving  being  dictated  by their  relative  rates  of
return:
(i)  Pay  any  arrears  on foreign  debt  service. This  use  of
foreign  exchange  will  generally  have the  highest  return
because  of the  large  premium  typically  charged  on imports
by countries  in  arrears.
(ii)  Increase  official  reserves.
(iii)  The government,  public  enterprises  and/or  private  firms
can  be encouraged  to  reduce  their  foreign  borrowing  and
to  accelerate  the  repayment  of  existing  external  debt.
(iv)  Public  enterprises,  commodity  stabilization  funds,  and/or
private  firms  and  households  can  be permitted  and
encouraged  to increase  their  holdings  of foreign  assets
during  booms.
(v)  Domestic  capital  investment  (and  associated  repair  and
maintenance)  expenditures  can  be increased.
15/  To this  should  be added  a risk  premium  that  varies  positively  with
the  riskiness  of the investment.
50(vi)  Trade,  financial,  and  exchange  rate  reforms  that  would
have been infeasible  were foreign  exchange  less  plentiful
can  be initiated  or accelerated.
Foreign  Reserve  Accumulation  and  Debt  Management
The  accumulation  of official  reserves  tends  to  occur  virtually
automatically  during  booms  in  most  developing  countries. This  tendency  is
strengthened  by regulations  that  require  all  exporters  to  convert  their
foreign  exchange  earnings  into  domestic  currency  within,  say,  three  months  of
receipt. The  massive  inflow  of foreign  exchange  has important  implications
for  domestic  monetary  control  and  inflation.  These  are  discussed  in  detail
below.
For  the  moment,  consider  the  question  of whether  the  increased  inflow  of
official  reserves  should  be used to  repay  external  debt.  Because  the  bulk  of
the  external  debt in  most  LDCs  was in  fact  incurred  by the  public  sector  (or
is  public  guaranteed),  this is  a central  public  finance  issue. At the  most
basic  level,  it seems  senseless  to  have  debt  outstanding  while,  at the  same
time,  accumulating  foreign  reserves,  if  the  cost  of  borrowing  exceeds  the
interest  rate  on reserves  (roughly  the  U.S.  T-bill  rate).  16/  There  are,
however,  several  qualifications  to this  point,  which  are  of practical
importance.  First,  the  demand  for  liquidity  (i.e.  foreign  reserves)  to
facilitate  or expand  trade  transactions  may reflect  a high  rate  of return.
In short,  the interest  rate  earned  on foreign  reserves  may  understate  their
marginal  social  product; Second,  on concessional  debt,  the  cost  of  borrowing
may  be below  rather  than  above  the  interest  rate  paid  on reserves. In this
case,  it  makes  good  economic  sense  to  take  the  implicit  subsidy  by increasing
16/  Table  2 above  shows  that  this  is,  in fact,  what  happened  in  Nigeria
during  the  1970s.
51holdings  of relatively  high-yield  foreign  reserves,  rather  than  accelerating
repayment  of concessional  debt. This  assumes,  perhaps  unrealistically,  that
the  existence  of ample  foreign  reserves  does  not  make  it impossible  for  the
authorities  to  resist  political  pressures  to increase  public  expenditures.
Third,  in  a  world  where  additional  borrowing  involves  certain  fixed  costs
(such  as  management,  syndication,  and  other  front-end  fees)  in addition  to
the  periodic  interest  payments,  it is costly  to  repay  existing  loans  today  if
the  country  is  going  to  have to  turn  around  and  borrow  more soon  after  the
boom  has subsided. The strength  of this  point  is  enhanced  by the  fact  that
the  cost  of borrowing  may  be higher  after  the  boom subsides  and
creditworthiness  is  re-evaluated.
Foreign  Asset  Accumulation
Capital  controls,  which  prohibit  or place  severe  limits  on the
acquisition  of foreign  assets  by domestic  residents,  frustrate  the  objective
of increasing  the  saving  of the  economy  as  a whole  during  booms.  17/  If the
private  sector  is  prevented  from  accumulating  foreign  assets,  the  burden  on
the  public  sector  to raise  its  saving  is increased. Furthermore,  the  foreign
regulation  that  requires  all  exporters  to convert  export  earnings  into  local
currency  within  a specified  period  exacerbates  the  monetary  impact  of the
boom.  Even  with  capital  controls  in  place,  which  reduces  international
capital  mobility  thereby  enhancing  monetary  autonomy,  sterilizing  this
monetary  impact  is  a difficult  task.
Responding  to the  suggestion  that  domestic  residents  be encouraged  to
increase  foreign  asset  holdings  during  booms,  one  Nigerian  asked,  "Why  should
17/  On the  management  of booms  in  the  presence  of capital  controls,  see
Appendix  A and  Cuddington  (1987).
52a  poor country  like  Nigeria  lend  money  to  a rich  country  like  the  United
States?" The answer  is  clear,  failure  to  do so is  likely  to lead  to  massive
overspending,  and  a reduction  in  Nigerian  welfare. Students  of the  Nigerian
oil  boom agree  that  overspending,  both for  high  consumption  and  "white
elephant"  investments,  was, in  fact,  a  very  real  problem. The  marginal
return  on investment  abroad  was  higher  than  that  realized  in  Nigeria.
In spite  of the  extra  burden  that  capital  controls  put on the  public
sector  to increase  saving,  many  developing  countries  are  reluctant  to  abolish
them,  fearing  that  "capital  flight"  may result. Such  capital  flight  would
represent  a significant  erosion  of the  government's  tax  base,  necessitating
higher  levels  of foreign  borrowing  or increased  reliance  on the inflation
tax.  Indeed,  capital  controls  can  only  be relaxed  if the  domestic  financial
system  is  not  severely  distorted  by regulated  interest  rates,  high  reserve
requirements,  and inflation.  After  adequate  development  of the  domestic
financial  system,  as well  as substantial  liberalization  of trade  in  goods  and
services,  restrictions  on private  capital  account  transactions  should  be
relaxed. This  will  often  necessitate  a realignment  of the  exchange  rate to
maintain  or restore  equilibrium  between  the  supply  and  demand  for  foreign
exchange.
An initial,  modest  step in  the  d.'ection  of reducing  restrictions  on
capital  outflows,  without  risking  large-scale  capital  flight,  would  be to
extend  gradually  the  period  that  exporters  can  hold foreign  exchange  proceeds
before  converting  them  to the  domestic  currency. This  approach  has  been  used
in  Colombia  as well  as other  LDCs  during  booms,  although  the  holding  period
has  been reduced  again  once  the  boom subsides  and  foreign  exchange  inflows
dwindle.
53A second  mechanism  that  is  occasionally  proposed is for  the  government
or the  central  bank  to sell  dollar-denominated  securities,  e.g. the  so-called
"coffee  bonds"  in the  Colombian  context,  either  to private  coffee  exporters
or the  coffee  marketing  board.  1LI  The  Colombian  central  bank issued  such
bonds  in  exchange  for  dollar  reserves  during  the  1976-80  coffee  boom  and  the
1985-86  mini-boom.  This  action  both contributed  to national  saving  and
sterilized  the  foreign  exchange  inflows,  thereby  reducing  the  inflationary
impact  of the  booms. The  consequences  would  have  been quite  different  had
the  government  rather  than  the  central  bank issued  the  coffee  bonds. First,
sterilization  would  not  have  occurred  automatically.  Second,  although  it
transfers  the  bondholders'  saving  to the  government,  national  saving  will  not
rise  unless  the  government  increases  its  fiscal  saving  correspondingly.
Otherwise,  private  saving  merely  finances  public  dissaving. If the  private
sector  is  prohibited  from  increasing  its  holdings  of foreign  assets,  the
public  sector  must do so if the  desired  increase  in  national  saving  is to  be
realized. The only  other  alternative  would  be to try  to absorb  the  entire
increase  in  national  saving  domestically  in the  form  of  higher  capital
investment.  This is inadvisable,  at least  in  the  short  run,  for  reasons
discussed  below.
The attractiveness  of acquiring  foreign  assets  depends  on expected
changes  in the  exchange  rate,  among  other  things. Typically,  during  a boom,
a real  appreciation  of the  domestic  currency  will  occur  as  higher  spending  on
nontradeable  goods  drives  up their  relative  price  in  terms  of tradeable
goods. As the  boom  subsides,  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  should
18/  Allowing  these  bonds  to trade  in  an active  secondary  market  would
facilitate  financial  intermediation  of the  boom income.
54return  gradually  to its  pre-boom  level,  assuming  no exchange  market
disequilibrium  to  being  with.  These  equilibrating  exchange  rate  movements,
affect  the  relative  attractiveness  of foreign  as opposed  to  domestic  assets.
As the  domestic  currency  temporarily  appreciates  and  market  participants
expect  this  movement  to subsequently  be reversed,  foreign  assets  become  more
attractive.  This,  of course,  helps  to induce  the  optimum  savings  response  to
the  boom.  Problems  can  arise  in  allocating  savings  efficiently,  however,  if:
(i)  disequilibrium  exchanges  prevail  at the  onset  of a boom,
(ii)  the  fiscal  authorities  adopt  expansionary  spending  policies
that  make the  subsequent  depreciation  of the  domestic  currency  at the
end  of the  boom  highly  unlikely  or,
(iii)  the  foreign  borrowing  strategy  is  overly  aggressive,  which
would  produce  large  capital  inflows  and  excessive  real  appreciation  of
the  currency  during  the  boom.
All of these  factors  do not  affect  the incentives  to  accumulate  foreign
assets  in the  same  way.  But they  do indicate  the  possibility  of a non-
optimal  acquisition  of foreign  assets  during  booms  if  capital  controls  were
to  be removed  leaving  unfettered  private  incentives  to  dictate  the  allocation
of the  windfall  savings  across  domestic  and  foreign  assets.
Domestic  Capital  Investment
Investment  should  be undertaken  only  to the  extent  (and  at a rate)  that
is  economic  when evaluated  at the  country's  international  borrowing  rate.  If
the  country  faces  credit  rationing  in the  world  markets,  an even  higher
discount  rate  should  be used to  reflect  the  true  opportunity  cost  of
funds.  12/  In addition  to this  simple  rule  of thumb,  which  ensures  the
19/  If loanable  funds  are  allocatedJ  domestically  by market-determined
interest  rates,  even though  the  country  faces  a foreign  borrowing  constraint,
the  domestic  interest  rate  would  be a good  indicator  of the  appropriate
discount  rate for  domestic  investment  decisions.
55optimal  allocation  of loanable  funds  and  choice  of capital  investments,  there
are important  issues  of timing,  domestic  and  foreign  content,  and  sectoral
allocation. To the  extent  that  capital  investment  uses  domestic  resources,
not  just imported  goods,  it  adds  to  aggregate  demand  and,  depending  on
capacity  utilization,  inflationary  pressure. For  this  reason,  it  may  be
advisable  to  postpone  investment  projects  that  have a  high domestic  resource
component  until  the  export  boom  begins  to subside. Highly  profitable
investments  with a large  import  content,  on the  other  hand,  might  be
accelerated  because  they  increase  the  derived  demand  for  foreign  exchange  at
a time  when  the  central  bank  may  be having  difficulty  sterilizing  reserve
inflows. In  short,  the  timing  as  well  as the  economic  profitability  of
investment  must  be considered  when  managing  temporary  export  booms.
A related  concern  when contemplating  large  capital  investment  expansion
is the economy's --  and especially the public sector's --  absorptive capacity
for  new investment.  Attempts  to increase  the  rate  of investment  too  quickly
during  booms  can  result  in  a severe  deterioration  in the  quality  of  planning,
project  appraisal,  and implementation  that  is  essential  if the  benefits  of
higher  investment  are  to  be realized. Excessive  expansion  in  public
investment  or "development"  projects  has  been  a  widespread  problem  in
countries  that  experienced  booms  in  the  1970s. Mexico  and  Nigeria,  oil
exporters,  are  notable  examples  of countries  that  experienced  uncontrolled
growth  in  public  investment  after  the  1973-74  and 1978-79  oil  price  hikes.
Regarding  the  sectoral  allocation  of domestic  investment,  unwarranted
expansion  of the  booming  sector  (at  the  expense  of other  eAportables,  and
import  substitutes)  is a common  problem. If  windfall  gains  accrue  largely  to
producers  in the  booming  sector,  i.e.  they  are  not taxed  away  by the
56government,  policies  must  be designed  to facilitate  the intermediation  of
these  savings.  Otherwise,  there  may  be overinvestment  in the  sector,  relative
to the  level  that  long-term  trends  in the  world  export  markets  would  justify.
(Recall  the  case  of forced  investment  in  coffee  inventories  by Colombia's
National  Coffee  Fund.) If the  financial  system  is  not sufficiently  well
developed  to  carry  out this  task,  it  may  be necessary  in the  short  run,  at
least,  to  use the  tax  system  coupled  with transfer  payments  or government
loans  to reallocate  the  windfall  towards  high-productivity  investments.
Limiting  the  extent  to  which  world  prices  are  passed  through  in the  form  of
higher  domestic  producer  prices  will also  help  to  prevent  overexpansion  of
the  booming  sector. (See  the  discussion  of  producer  prices  and  commodity
stabilization  funds  above.)
Many countries  find  that  the  value  of their  currency,  as measured  by the
real  effective  exchange  rate,  appreciates  sharply  during  booms. This
appreciation  can  easily  prove  excessive,  however,  either  due  to the  monetary
and inflationary  impact  of the  export  revenue  surge  20/ (and  a failure  to
adjust  the  nominal  exchange  rate  to  compensate  for  higher  domestic  inflation)
or  because  of overspending  by the  public  or  private  sectors. Excessive
appreciation  can  bias investment  towards  the  nontradeables  at the  expense  of
non-booming-sector  tradeables  production.  Particularly  if the  government  has
a  policy  of trying  to diversify  and  expand  domestic  production  of tradeable
goods  (by  eliminating  existing  distortions  against  production  in  sectors  with
strong  export  potential),  it  may  wish to  undertake  investment  in  non-
traditional  export  industries  using  the  windfall  gain  from the  booming  export
20/  See  Sebastian  Edwards  (1985)  on real  exchange  rate  overshooting
caused  by the  monetary  impact  of  export  booms.
57sector. The task  of "picking  winners"  among  potential  export  sectors  is  a
difficult  one,  however. A strong  case  can  be made that  it is  best left  to
the  private  sector. It  may  be desirable  to allocate  some  public  investment
funds  obtained  during  the  boom to large-scale.  export-oriented  projects,  as
Colombia  did  in its  oil,  coal,  and  nickel  sectors  during  the  1976-80  coffee
boom.  The  case  for  doing  so is  s:rengthened  in  situations  where  the  private
capital  market  is too  small  or insufficiently  developed  to allow  the  private
sector  to finance  such  investments.  2
Monetary  Aspects  of Coffee  Booms
Almost  without  exception,  commodity  export  booms  in  developing  countries
have  been accompanied  by a surge  in  domestic  inflation  rates  relative  to
those  prevailing  abroad.  2/  In fact,  it  is  often  argued  that  a surge  in the
domestic  inflation  rate is  an inevitable  consequence  of the  large  foreign
exchange  inflows  that  accompany  export  booms. This is  not  the  case.  First,
allowing  increased  imports  will  reduce  inflationary  pressure  by increasing
the  demand  for  the  additional  foreign  exchange  being  received  by the  central
bank.  Second,  mechanisms  exist  for  sterilizing  at least  part of the  foreign
reserve  inflows,  even  in  countries  with only  rudimentary  financial  markets.
The  potential  for  sterilization  is  greatly  enhanced  if  the  government  can
generate  fiscal  surpluses;  this  enablef  it  to repay  domestic  credit  from
central  bank,  thereby  offsetting  the  expansion  of the  monetary  base caused  by
foreign  exchange  inflows. Increased  fiscal  saving  is,  of course,  what
21/  The large  financing  requirements  may  also  justify  foreign  direct
investment  in  such  sectors.  Colombip&s  experience  with  joint  venture  projects
with foreign  firms  is  noteworthy  here.
22/  See  Cuddington  (1986)  on Colombia  and  Rajaram  (1985)  on Sub-Saharan
Africa  for  empirical  evidence.
58optimal  policy  dictates  during  booms. As we discussed  above,  inflationary
pressure  is caused  not  only  by the  export  boom itself,  but  by the
uncontrolled  expansion  in government  expenditure  and  domestic  credit  creation
to finance  the  resulting  fiscal  deficits  that  accompany,  and  outlive,  the
boom.  W  If sterilization  is  unfeasible  (or  not  attempted)  under  managed
exchange  rates,  then  there  is  a presumption  that  the  money  supply  will
increase  by several  times  the  amount  of the  foreign  reserve  inflow,  due to
the  standard  money  multiplier  process.  ZA/  This  problem  is  exacerbated  in
many developing  countries  where  foreign  exchange  regulations  require
exporters  to convert  all  export  proceeds  into  the  local  currency  within
several  months  of receipt. Because  none  of the  boom revenue  can (legally)  be
held in the  form  of foreign  assets,  it is  completely  monetized  unless  the
monetary  authority  can  take  offsetting  action.  (See  Appendix  A.)
To assess  the inflationary  pressure  caused  by the  boom,  the
aforementioned  increase  in  money  supply  must  be compared  to the  anticipated
increase  in  money  demand. The derived  demand  for  transactions  balances
should  be larger  for  permanent  booms  than  for  temporary  or cyclical  shifts  in
23/  In the  literature  on the  monetary  aspects  of the  Dutch  Disease,
there  is some  disagreement  as to  whether  export  booms  will  have an
inflationary  or deflationary  effect. In short,  the  argument  is over  whether
the  boom-induced  increases  in money  demand  will  exceed  or fall  short  of the
boom-induced  increases  in  money  supply. Under  flexible  exchange  rates  and
free  capital  mobility,  there  will  be no endogenous  change  in  the  money  supply
unless  the  monetary  authority  elects  to  be "accommodative."  Hence,  because
the  boom raises  money  demand,  it  is deflationary.  This is  the  situation
discussed,  for  example,  by Neary  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1984)  with  reference  to
the  British  or  other  developed  country  variant  of the  Dutch  Disease.  The
discussion  in the  text  focusses  on the  money  supply  aspects  in  countries  that
have  managed  (rather  than  floating)  exchange  rate  regimes.
24/  See  Robert  E.  Cumby  and  Maurice  Obstfeld  (1983)  for  an interesting
study  of sterilization  in  Mexico. They find  that  the  Mexican  monetary
authority  was  able to  sterilize  virtually  all  of the  foreign  reserve  inflows
during  the  second  half  of the  1970s.
59income,  because  the  latter  imply  smaller  increases  in expenditure.  During
temporary  booms,  money  demand  will typically  increase  by considerably  less
than  money  supply,  causing  considerable  inflationary  pressure. Unless  the
monetary  authority  continues  to  adjust  the  nominal  exchange  rate  to  reflect
the  differential  between  the  domestic  and  world  inflation  rates,  there  will
be a sharp  increase  in the  real  effective  exchange  rate  and,  hence,  an
adverse  effect  on the  international  competitiveness  of non-coffee  exports.
In countries  with  reasonably  deep  secondary  markets  for  government
securities,  contractionary  open  market  operations  can  be used to  offset  or
"sterilize"  the  increase  in the  monetary  base  caused  by foreign  oxchange
purchases  by the  central  bank.  In  many  LDCs,  open  market  operations  are
precluded  by the  absence  of such  securities  markets. Nevartheless,  a number
of  other  mechanisms  can  be used to  control  the  rate  of  monetary  expansion
during  boom  periods. One  often-used  sterilization  method  is to increase  the
marginal  reserve  requirements  that  commercial  banks  must  hold against  their
deposit  liabilities.  Although  this  policy  rosponse  reduces  the  monetary
consequences  of the  boom,  it  amounts  to a tax  on the  banking  system,  thereby
reducing  the  efficiency  of financial  intermediation  by widening  the  gap
between  borrowing  and  lending  rates  of interest. These  effects  reduce  the
incentive  to  save  during  the  very periods  when efforts  to increase  saving  are
particularly  important.  25/
Preferable  mechanisms  for  sterilizing  foreign  exchange  inflows  reduce
the  flow-through  from  foreign  reserves  to the  monetary  base  directly,  rather
than  attempting  to sever  the  link  between  the  monetary  base and  the  broader
25/  To the  extent  that  increased  reserve  requirements  indireczly
encourage  new types  of financial  intermediation,  the  adverse  effects  on
saving  will  be mitigated.
60aggregates  (as  increasing  reserve  requirements  does). Even  in the  absence  of
open  market  operations  this  is still  feasible  in  many  LDCs.  During  the  1985-
86  mini-boom,  for  example,  the  Colombian  monetary  authority  sold  non-monetary
liabilities  to the  commercial  banks  in order  to  reduce  the  increase  in  high-
powered  money. The  net  effect  of this  action  on the  money  supply  is  the  same
as that  of an  open  market  operation. A related  sterilization  mechanism  would
be to sell  "coffee  bonds"  to  private  coffee  producers  or the  coffee  marketing
board,  thereby  reducing  the  increase  in  domestic  liquidity.
61VI.  CONCLUSIONS
Fiscal  policy  in commodity-exporting  cour.tries  differs  in  at least  two
ways from  fiscal  policy  in other  LDCs.  First,  government  revenues  tend  to  be
highly  dependent  on fluctuations  in  primary  export  earnings. This is  true
when export  taxes  form  a large  component  of the  total  tax  base,  but it  also
arises  when  most  of the  windfall  gain  from  booms  accrues  initially  to  the
private  sector,  as the  example  of Kenya  during  the  1976-78  coffee  boom
illustrates.  The  problem  of developing  and  maintaining  a diverse  tax  bass  is
particularly  acute  in such  economies.  Second,  surges  in  government  revenues
tend  to  be accompanied  by sharp  increases  in  government  spending,  which  are
difficult  to reverse  when the  boom ends. As a result  booms  often  lead  to
large  fiscal  deficits,  rather  than  surpluses. This  lack  of expenditure
control  is  perhaps  the  key fiscal  problem  in  most  commodity  exporting
countries. Associated  with it  are  overvalued  exchange  rates,  sectoral
distortions  in  resource  allocation,  and  monetary  and  financial  disequilibria
necessit2ted  by fiscal  deficit  finance. Consequently,  countries  with  macro
mismanagement  have  often  found  themselves  worse  off  after  the  booms  subsided
than  before  they  occurred:  economic  distortions  have  been  exacerbated  and
policy  flexibility  has  been reduced. On the  other  hand,  countries  whose
fiscal  management  during  booms  has  been relatively  conservative,  such  as
Cameroon  (during  the  coffee  and  petroleum  booms  of the  1970s)  and  Colombia
(during  the  coffee  mini-boom  of 1985-86),  have  generally  benefitted  from
booms. Clearly,  good  fiscal  control  during  periodic  boom episodes  enables
these  booms  to temporarily  accelerate  the  rate  of economic  development.
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65APPENDIX  A
THE  IMPACT  OF CAPITAL  CONTROLS
ON THE  MANAGEMENT  OF EXPORT  BOOMS
Foreign  exchange  controls  on current  account  and  capital  account
transactions  not  only  have  monetary  controls  implications.  In  many  countries
they  are  an important  fiscal  instrument  of the  government. [Dornbusch  has
emphasized  that  a multiple  exchange  rate  system  can  be mimicked  by a  uniform
exchange  rate  combined  with  a set  of taxes  and subsidies  on  various  trade  and
international  financial  transactions.]  The  presence  of foreign  exchange
controls  also  affects  the  macroeconomic  management  of periodic  export  booms.
If one assumes  that  commodity  export  booms  are  temporary  phenomena  or
that  commodity  prices  are  very  uncertain  (so  that  this  uncertainty  is  more
important  than  any  attempt  to decompose  price  movements  into  permanent  and
temporary  components),  booms  should  be accompanied  by large  increases  in
national  saving. The  extent  to  which  this  additional  saving  should
ultimately  be invested  domestically  as opposed  to  abroad  depends  critically
on  whether  controls  on capital  inflows  and  outflows  are  binding  before  the
export  boom.  For  reasons  given  in the  text,  it is  extremely  unlikely  that
the  entire  amount  of the  additional  saving  generated  during  booms  can  be
efficiently  absorbed  by domestic  capital  investment,  at least  in the  short
run. Hence,  the  optimal  strategy  for  the  country  as a  whole involves
increasing  considerably  its  net  foreign  assets.
Foreign  exchange  controls  are  relevant  here  because  they  limit  the
extent  and  the  mechanisms  through  which  the  economy  can  acquire  foreign
assets. By segmenting  the  domestic  financial  market  from  the  world  market,
at least  to some  extent,  capital  controls  cause  domestic  interest  rates  to
respond  to  boom-induced  increases  in  national  saving  in a  way that  is  quite
different  from  their  response  in the  absence  of controls,  where  domestic
interest  rates  would  remain  equal  to the  prevailing  rates  in  the  world
financial  markets  plus the  rate  of  expected  depreciation  of the  peso.
Induced  changes  in interest  rates,  in turn,  affect  domestic  demand  for  money
and  non-monetary  assets  and,  hence,  the  inflationary  impact  of the  boom.
The  direction  of domestic  real  interest  rate  movements  will  depend
critically  on the  nature  of the  foreign  exchange  controls  and the  central
bank's  response  to  the  foreign  exchange  inflow  from  export  proceeds.
When foreign  exchange  regulations  require  that  all  export  proceeds  be
converted  into  local  currency,  the  huge increase  in the  domestic  monetary
base  that results  can  cause  difficult  monetary  controls  problems  for  the
central  bank.  It is  sometimes  argued  that  inflation  is an  unavoidable
consequence  of temporary  export  booms. This is  not  entirely  true.  It is
argued  here that  inflation  is  at least  in  part the  consequence  of the  foreign
exchange  controls  system. The  availability  of various  central  bank
mechanisms  for  sterilizing  the  impact  of foreign  reserve  inflows  on the
66domestic  money  supply  also  plays  a role.  26/  One  such  mechanism  is  to
increase  marginal  reserve  requirements.  This  policy  tool  may  be interpreted
as a fiscal  instrument;  it is,  in effect,  an increase  in  the  tax  on financial
intermediaries.  Although  it  may  facilitate  sterilization  and  the  finance  of
fiscal  deficits  while  reducing  its  inflationary  consequences,  the  higher  tax
on saving  and investment  during  booms  has counterproductive  incentive
effects.
26/  Colombia's  experience  in this  regard  is interesting  because  of the
role  that  the  National  Coffee  Fund  has  played  in the  sterilization  process.
Nevertheless,  complete  sterilization  of the  monetary  impact  of the  boom  has
remained  an elusive  goal,  with the  monetary  aggregates  growing  considerably
more rapidly  than  the  boom-induced  growth  in  money  demand  in  the  1976-79
period. This  caused  inflation  to  surge  and  real  interest  rates  to fall
sharply  to large  negative  values  in 1976-77. These  developments  presumably
reduce  much-needed  increments  to saving,  while  at the  same time  inducing
excessive  domestic  investment  expenditures.
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MACRO  EFFECTS  OF THE  1976-80  COFFEE  EXPORT  BOOM  IN COLOMBI4  27/
The  1976-80  boom,  reflected  in the  price  data  in  Table  1,  caused  a sharp
improvement  in the  country's  current  account  position,  moving  it from  a
modest  deficit  of 2.8  percent  of GDP  in 1974  to  a surplus  that  peaked  at 2.3
percent  of GDP  in 1977. GDP  growth  surged,  but  only  fleetingly,  above  its
post-war  average,  growing  at 8.5  percent  in 1978. More importantly,  however,
the  coffee  export  boom  caused  a massive  build-up  in  foreign  exchange
reserves. This  foreign  reserve  inflow  was  accentuated  --  relative  to  what
might  have  been expected  in  a countries  like  Great  Britain  or the  Netherlands
during  their  energy  booms  --  by foreign  exchange  regulations  requiring  that
coffee  exporters  convert  all foreign  exchange  earnings  into  domestic
currency. Trade  restrictions  that  limit  the  demand  for  foreign  exchange  were
relaxed  only  gradually. Hence,  although  the  volume  of imports  increased
somewhat,  the  resulting  increase  in foreign  exchange  demand  was small
relative  to the  inflow  from  the  coffee  bonanza. As a result,  the  country's
reserves,  excluding  gold,  rose  more  than  tenfold  from  US$475  million  in 1976
to  US$4,831  million  in 1980.
The  large  increase  in the  foreign  reserves  of the  Colombian  monetary
authority  raises  a  number  of questions.  First,  what  was the  monetary  impact
of the  foreign  reserve  inflow  caused  by the  boom?  Did it  lead  to a rapid
expansion  in the  domestic  money  supply,  or did  the  authorities  succeed  in
"sterilizing"  its  effect? What role  did  or could  fiscal  policy  play  in this
sterilization  process? Second,  what  happened  to the  domestic  inflation  rate
(relative  to prevailing  world  levels)  during  the  boom?  Was inflation
primarily  a "monetary  phenomenon"  during  this  episode?  In particular,  is
there  any  evidence  of  a growing  imbalance  between  the  growth  in  money  demand,
which  occurs  as national  income  rises  during  a  boom,  and  the  growth  in  money
supply  (caused  either  by unsterilized  foreign  reserve  inflows  or increases  in
domestic  credit  creation)? Third,  did the  foreign  exchange  market
intervention  keep  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  from  becoming  seriously
over-  or undervalued7
A.  Inflation  and the  Real  Exchange  Rate
In order  to  answer  these  questions,  we  begin  by examining  the  movements
in  Colombia's  inflation  rate  and  real  exchange  rate. During  the  1976-80
boom,  the  country  experienced  a temporary  surge  in its  inflation  rate
relative  to the  rates  prevailing  in  the  rest  of the  world. As Table  2 shows,
Colombian  inflation  as measured  by the  consumer  price  index  (CPI)  registered
33.1  percent  in 1977,  the  year  when coffee  prices  peaked. In contrast,  world
inflation  was  only 11.3  percent  that  year. 2 8/  The  inflation  differential
27/  This  appendix  is  material  taken  from  Cuddington  (1986,  Section  IV).
28/  The  measure  of  world  inflation  used  here  is from  the  IMF's
International  Financial  Statistics,  line  64x.
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TABLE  I
PRICES,  TERNS  OF  TRADE,  AND  THE  REAL  EFFECTIVE  EXCHANGE  RATE
......  ..........  ......  ...........  _.......  .......  ................  ..
------  . ......  . . .......  . ..........  ..  ..  . __...  . . ..  ..  .. _.
REAL  EFFECTIVE  COLONIIAN
END  EXPORT  EITERNAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  REAL
OF  COFFEE  TERNS  OF  TRADE  WEIGNTED  EXCHANGE
YEAR  PRICES  1/  TRADE  21  AVERAGE  3/  RATE  4/
(US  D%LLARS)
. . a  _.  ..  .............  _.  ..  ......... a...............  ......  . . _._.
197O  32  75.0  91.1  59.1
1971  27  70.2  94.0  60.8
1972  31  73.7  100.7  41.0
1973  41  78.4  101.7  57.9
1974  44  81.6  100.4  54.9
1975  46  75.7  118.6  60.1
1974  84  104.3  116.7  59.3
1977  134  141.4  101.3  50.3
1978  104  110.0  103.4  48.8
1979  103  98.4  101.4  47.5
1980  100  100.0  100.0  47.3
.~~~~~~~~~~~.  _..  . ....  ....  ....  ....................  -..  --  ---
1981  72  94.4  93.0  47.2
1982  78  81.6  97.4  47.3
1983  74  93.9  89.7  50.1
1994  81  86.9  95.4  57.6
I/-Obtained  from  IFS  line  76e.d. Inden  is  in US  Dollars.
2/-Obtained  by dividing the o.s.  dollar  export  prices  index  to  the u.s.  dollar  import prices index  (multiplied  by
3/-Obtained  from  Ms.  Chiaui,  INM  (1-57543).  Increause  in  the  index  indtcate  real depreciation  of the  Colombia  pis
41-RERuspesus  per  us dolla  (period averagel  *  U.S.consuwer  price)  i Coloobian  consumr  price.COLOIIIA11-24-61FlLE  NAMl  i CPI
TAK.E  2
...........  .............  _
COLO"IM  WORLD  us
CPI  CPI  CPI  Val  us
IWLATIO  INFLATION INFLUT1  tNfLATION  INFAUTION
YEAR  RATE  II  RATE  1/  RATE  1/  DIFERENTIAL  DIFERENTIAL
............  . .........  . ..  . ..........................  _.  . .. 
1971  9.0  5.4  4.3  3.4  4.7
1972  13.4  S.3  3.3  8.1  10.1
1973  20.0  9.0  4.2  I1.6  14.4
1974  Z'.3  15.2  11.0  9.1  13.3
1975  22.9  13.3  9.1  9.4  13.5
1974  20.2  11.1  5.8  9.1  14.4
1917  33.1  11.3  4.5  21.1  24.6
1971  17.0  9.7  7.4  *.1  10.2
1979  24.7  12.5  11.3  12.2  13.4
1990  26.5  15.0  13.5  10.t  13.0
1981  27.5  14.1  10.4  13.4  17.1
1982  24.5  12.3  6.2  12.2  18.3
1903  19.6  12.4  3.2  7.2  13.4
1164  14.1  14.1  4.3  2.0  11.5
== =5a5_...  ........  ...... …......sss
I/-IFS, LINE  64..1.vis-a-vis  the  US CPI  deteriorated  even  more,  as the  Table  shows. Thus,  there
was  a clear  tendency  for  the  inflation  differential  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of the
world  to  widen  during  the  boom  years. This  experience,  by the  way, is  by  no
means  unique  to  Colombia;  it  also  occurred  in  other  countries  that  had  com-
modity  export  booms  during  the  1970s.  (See  Davis,1983,  for  a discussion.)
As the  last  two  columns  in  Table  1 imply,  the  rise  in the  inflation
differential  (either  against  the  US or the  world  as a  whole)  was  not  matched
by an equal  increase  in the  rate  of  crawl  of the  Colombian  peso.  Conse-
quently,  a sharp  appreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  occurred. The
trade-weighted  real  effective  exchange  rate  index  appreciated  more than  30
percent  from  118.6  in 1975  to  87.4 in  1982, when the  monetary  authority
belatedly  began  to  engineer  a real  depreciation  of the  peso.  This  real
exchange  rate  appreciation,  and  the  strong  real  wage increases  that
accompanied  the  boom,  drastically  reduced  the  international  competitiveness
of non-coffee  exports.
These  factors  evidently  more than  offset  the  slow  progress  on the  trade
liberalization  front  during  this  period,  because  the  growth  rate  of
non-coffee  exports  slowed  significantly.  Hence,  Colombia  experienced  the
sort  of slowdown  in its  non-booming  tradeables  sector  discussed  in  the  Dutch
Disease  literature.  The ratio  of non-coffee  exports  plummeted  from  10.7
percent  of GDP in 1976  to  6.6  percent  in 1983,  roughly  the  same  share  they
had  held in the  mid-1960s  before  the  export  diversification  drive  began.  In
short,  the  slow,  but steady,  progress  in diversifying  the  country's  export
base  between  1967  and 1974  was  completely  reversed  during  the  coffee  boom
period.
It is  now  widely  recognized  that  the  overvaluation  of the  exchange  rate
that  developed  during  the  coffee  boom caused  a major  setback  in  the  country's
long-standing  program  of export diversification  and  contributed  to the
severity  of the  economic  downturn  after  the  coffee  boom  ended. From  a policy
standpoint,  therefore,  two  questions  arise:
a.  Is inflation  an  unavoidable  consequence  of the  c.ommodity  price
boom  or can it  be prevented  by appropriate  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  action?
b.  To the  extent  that  the  inflationary  surge  can  not  be prevented,
would  it  be advisable  to  accelerate  the  rate  of crawl  of the  peso in  order  to
match  the  inflation  differential,  thereby  preventing  the  exchange  rate  from
becoming  overvalued?
B.  The  Monetary  Policy  Response
This section  leaves  aside  the  second  question  regarding  exchange  rate
policy  and focuses  on the  monetary  aspects  of the  boom.  We start  with  the
presumption that inflation is  - ultimately, at least --  a monetary
phenomenon,  i.e.  it is caused  by monetary  growth  in  excess  of the  growth  in
money  demand.
It is  sometimes  claimed  that  inflation  is  an unavoidable  side-effect  of
export  booms,  because  the  surge  in  foreign  exchange  earnings  leads  to  rapid
69growth  in  the  foreign  exchange  reserves  of the  central  bank.  29/  This  is
especially  true  when exporters  are  legally  obligated  to  convert  foreign
exchange  revenue  into  domescic  currency,  as is the  case  in  Colombia. The
resulting  foreign  exchange  inflow,  therefore,  necessarily  causes  an increase
in the  domestic  monetary  base. This  monetary  effect  is allegedly  difficult
to sterilize  in the  absence  of  well-developed  financial  markets  that  could  be
used  in conducting  contractionazy  open-market  operations. 30/
To examine  the  validity  of this  view,  we first  examine  the  tightness  of
the  link  between  foreign  exchange  inflows  and increases  in  the  domestic
monetary  base.  The  following  questions  arise:
a.  To what  extent  is  it  possible  to  sterilize  in the  absence  of open  market
operations?
b.  What  are the  mechanics  of sterilization  in  this  environment?
c.  To what  extent  does  sterilization  depend  on the  possibility  of generating
a fiscal  surplus?
Although  its  is  often  claimed  that  there  is  a  very tight  link  between
foreign  reserve  inflows  and  the  monetary  base in  developing  countries  (see
e.g. the  literature  on the  monetary  approach  to the  balance  of  payments),
this  link  appears  to  be very  loose  in the  case  of Colombia. As Table  3 shows
using  data for  the  1975-81  period,  there  is  often  a significant  divergence
between  the  change  in the  foreign  assets  of the  central  bank and  changes  in
the  monetary  base.  Not  only  are  the  relative  magnitudes  of changes  in the
two  time  series  different,  they  sometimes  even  have  different  signsl In
fact,  the  simple  correlation  coefficient  between  the  series  over  the  1951-84
period  is slightly  negative  (-0.094),  not  positive  as the  argument  above
would  suggest. Thus,  it  may, in  fact,  be possible  to  sterilize  the  effect  of
reserve  inflows  on the  Colombian  monetary  base.
Even  in the  absence  of a deep,  well-developed  government  bond  market,
which  would  permit  open  market  operations  as a method  of sterilizing  foreign
reserve  inflows there  are  a number  of other  instruments  or  mechanisms  that
might  be used.  31/  To reduce  net  credit  from  the  central  bank  to the
29/  This  statement  implies  that  the  growth  in  money  demand  caused  by
the  boom-induced  increase  in  national  income  typically  falls  short  of the
growth  in  money  supply  caused  by the  inflow  of foreign  exchange  earnings.
30/  This  theme  dominates  in  writings  on the  "monetary  approach  to the
balance  of payments." See,  e.g.,  Frenkel  and  H.G.  Johnson  (1976).
31/  Although  open  market  operations  were not  used  much during  the  1976-
80  boom,  changes  in  reserve  requirements  being  the  main  monetary  policy
instrument,  they  have  been  used  extensively  during  the  current  (1986)  coffee
boom.  The  market  for  government  securities,  however,  is  still  relatively
small,  and  the  feasibility  of open  market  operations  may  be inhibited  by
interest  rate  ceilings  if interest  rates  continue  to  rise.
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TAKE  3
THE  INFACT  OF  F  IISI  MN  INFLOW  U THE IT  US
BILLIONS  9  ESOS
YEAR  1915  974  It"  1971  1979  1M  1"I  1M  1M  t194
CHAE  1 NET  FOlfIN
ASSEtS  C  CENTML  Ullt  1  4.32  23.57  2.34  27.75  75.A  79.41  45.43  2.0  -6.71  -11.0
CHmE  IN ET  CEIT
To  6OEIN  21  3.04  -2.92  -1.53  -4.45  -21."  -9.74  -1.34  54.51  41.29  147.64
UNITRY  BAl 3/  7.45 15.4  21.44  40.15  33.49 43.4  44.73 42.05  52.25  10.
PECENTAIE  CHA
IN  "NITY  ALE  25.42  41.54  40.13  53.4  29.29  29.36  24.32  17.56  1.56  23.53
SOM a  IFS  DATA  UK.
I/-IEt FOEI6 AST  * FORIGN  ASSTS  - FOREIGN  LIADILITIES  -LO-TEM  FOREIGN  InR"II  lIPS  LINE  11-16C-16CU.
-CHAS IN  NET  CREIT  * CLAIRE  U  6OVEUNT  - GORNET DMITS (IFS  LINE  12-10).
3/-CHAINE  IN  RESERE  OE,  IFS  LINE  14.government  --  which  is,  in effect,  what  contractionary  open  market  operAtions
do - - the  government  can  repay  loans  from  the  central  bank in  periods  when
foreign  reserve  inflows  are  large. This  repayment  could  even  be financed  by
borrowing  from  Sommercial  banks  in order  to repay  government  loans  from  the
central  bank,  although  this  strategy  ultimataly  crowds  out  private  investment
(which  may  hinder  an efficient  private-sector  response  to the  boom).
Alternatively,  the  government  can  reduce  its  net  liabilities  from  the  central
bank  by running  a fiscal  surplus  and  either  depositing  this  surplus  in  its
accounts  at the  central  bank,  or repaying  loans  from  the  central  bank.
The data  in  Table  3  suggest  that  a small  amount  of sterilization  did
occur  in 1976-79. Unfortunately,  the  reduction  in  government  net  credit  from
the  banking  system  was  much  too  small  to  offset  the  massive  reserve  inflows.
Only  in 1979,  when the  75.6  billion  peso  increase  in  net  foreign  assets  of
the  central  bank  was  accompanied  by a 21.99  billion  peso  drop  in  net  credit
to the  government,  did  the  reduction  in  government  credit  significantly
reduce  the  expansion  of the  monetary  base that  would  otherwise  have  occurred.
All in all,  however,  the  sterilization  of foreign  reserve  inflows  during  the
boom appears  to  have  been  very  modest,  judging  from  the  fact  that  changes  in
government  net  credit  from  the  central  bank  provided  little  offset  to the
large  inflows  of foreign  exchange. Consequently,  the  domestic  monetary  base
increased  at 42,  40,  54  and 30  percent  per annum  in  1976-79  respectively.  32/
One  must  be particularly  careful  about  viewing  the  1979  movements  in the
central  bank's  balance  sheet  as sterilization  activity. In that  year  the
public  sector  un,lertook  a large  amount  of external  borrowing.  33/  At the
same  time,  Table  4 shows  that  a considerable  portion  of the  reduction  in the
government's  net  liabilities  to the  central  bank  was  due to  a large  increase
in government  deposits  at the  central  bank.  What  was, in fact,  occurring  was
rather  slow  disbursement  of funds  for  public  investment  projects  being
financed  by foreign  borrowing. In the  meantime,  the  borrowed  funds  are  held
as government  deposits  at the  central  bank. Although  this  activity  causes
foreign  reserve  inflows  to increase  and  government  liabilities  net  of
deposits  to the  central  bank to decrease,  this  is  not reflecting  sterili-
zation  activity  in  the  usual  sense  oF the  term.
32/  Another,  overlooked,  mechanism  for  sterilizing  at least  a small
part  of reserve  inflows  operates  through  advance  deposit  requirements  on
imports. If  a country  has  such  requirements,  as Colombia  does,  then  the
relaxation  of controls  to allow  more  imports  into  the  country  will induce  an
increase  in the  amount  of domestic  money  that  must  be put  on deposit  at the
central  bank.  Assuming  the  central  bank does  not  act  to offset  this  contrac-
tionary  effect  on the  money  supply,  the  net  effect  of the  boom  on the  money
supply  will  be reduced  somewhat. Advance  deposits  on imports  did, in fact,
rise  during  the  1976-80  coffee  boom,  but the  increase  was  very small  relative
to the  massive  inflow  of foreign  exchange  reserves.
33/  See  Cuddington  (1985) for  a  detailed  discussion  of  Colombian
external  borrowing  in the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.
71Nonetheless,  it is  certainly  true  that,  to  the  extent  that  the  loans
ultimately lead to the purchase of foreign goods --  i.e. greater imports --
the  net foreign  reserve  inflow  would  be reduced,  as  would  the  expansionary
effect  of the  export  boom  on the  monetary  base.  Indeed,  this  is one  of the
reasons  why Colombia  has tended  to relax  import  restrictions  during  boom
periods:  allowing  more imports  to enter  the  country  reduces  the  net inflow  of
foreign  reserves,  and  hence  the  inflationary  effect  on the  monetary  base.
This  beneficial  effect  of greater  imports,  however,  has  often  been reduced  by
the  sluggishness  of the  trade  bureaucracy.
Whether  it  was  feasible  to significantly  reduce  the  rate  of expansion  of
the  monetary  base  during  commodity  export  booms  by more  aggressive
sterilization  is  unclear  from  the  historical  evidence.  34/  It does  seem
reasonable  to conclude,  however,  that  the  possibility  of sterilization  will
be greatly  enhanced  if  the  government  can  generate  a fiscal  surplus  during
boom  periods,  so that  its  net credit  from  the  central  bank  can  be greatly
reduced.  35/  If  the  government  does  not  drastically  reduce  its  demand  for
credit,  the  only  option  open  to the  central  bank  may  be to  reduce  credit  to
the  private  sector,  if it  wants  to  maintain  control  over the  monetary  base.
Up to this  point,  we have discussed  the  feasibility  of sterilizing  the
monetary  impact  of export  booms  by offsetting  the  effect  of reserve  inflows
on the  monetary  base.  Achieving  this  objective  was seen  to  depend
importantly  on fiscal  policy  considerations.  The  usual  presumption  is that
it is  growth  in  some  monetary  aggregate,  such  as  Ml or  M2,  not  growth  in the
monetary  base,  that  is  most  closely  linked  to domestic  inflation.  There  is  a
long,  and  still  unresolved,  debate  in  the industrial  country  context  about
which  definition  of money  provides  the  tightest  link  between  money  and
inflation. In the  Colombian  context,  however,  a  number  of empirical  studies
have  documented  the  link  between  M2 and inflation.
Assuming  that it is  growth  in  M2 (or  Ml) in  excess  of the  growth  in  real
money  demand  that  causes  inflation,  another  instrument  is  available  for
reducing  the  monetary  impact  of coffee  booms,  namely,  the  monetary  authority
can  raise  the  reserve  reguirements  on commercial  bank  deposits. From  a
fiscal  policy  viewpoint,  reserve  requirements  are  a tax  on the  financial
system. From  a monetary  perspective,  the  increase  in  reserve  requirements
reduces  the  money  multiplier;  thus,  even  if export  booms  do cause  an increase
in  the  monetary  base,  their  effect  on  broader  mc etary  aggregates  will  be
reduced. This  mechanism  for  sterilizing  foreign  Leserve  inflows  has  been
used  extensively  by the  Colombian  monetary  authorities.  As Table  4 shows,
the  ratio  of reserve  money (i.e.  the  monetary  base)  to  Ml rose  sharply  from
.61  in 1974  to .93  in  1981. The reserve  money/M2  ratio  also increased  --
34/  The  monetary  policy  developments  in  1986  provided  strong  evidence
that  sterilization  was indeed  feasible. The  Central  Bank  has  succeeied  in
sterilizing  a large  fraction  of the  surge  in  coffee  export  earnings  in  1985-
86 via  open  market  operations.
35/  The  appropriate  fiscal  policy  response  to  booms  is  discussed  in
more  detail  below.
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MIETARY RESPONSE  TO THE DOOM
anaR  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1976  1979  1950  1981  1952  1953  1954
-------------------- _----------------------------------------------__--------__--------------------------------------------,--.----------
RESURVE  NOEY/m1  0.61  0.61  0.59  0.60  0.61  0.64  0.67  0.72  0.87  0.90  0.91  0.93  0.  7  0.54  0.84
ESERvE  NONZY/K2  O.53  0.53  0.50  0.49  0.47  0.48  0.51  0.53  0.64  0.67  0.60  0.5S  0. 3  0.51  0.50
RSERVE  ZaBEl  (growth  rate)  - 12.1  23.2  31.1  21.3  25.4  41.5  40.1  53.6  29.3  29.4  24.3  17.6  1U.6  23.5
ml  Igrowth  rate)  - 11.9  27.1  30.8  17.8  20.1  34.7  30.4  25.4  24.8  20.0  20.7  25.4  23.4  24.1
K2  (growth  rate)  - 13.2  29.2  35.0  25.2  23.2  33.9  33.5  27.9  22.8  45.0  35.6  20.9  25.4  23.9
REAL GDP  (growth  rate)  9.3  6.0  7.7  6.7  5.7  2.3  4.7  4.2  8.5  5.4  4.1  .33  0.9  1.0  3.0
SIAL  ReSERV.S MINUS
GOLD IMILLIONS $US)  1/  189  188  309  516  431  475  1101  1747  2366  3844  4831  4801  3861  1901  1364
PERCPITAGZ  cHAeNG  - -0.5  64.4  67.0  -16.5  10.2  131.6  58.7  35.4  62.5  25.7  -0.6  -19.6  -S0.5  -25.2
CENTRAL  DANK  SELECTED  ASSETS  AND LIABILITIES
NET FOREIGN ASSETS 2/  1.8  1.5  5.2  9.4  8.0  12.3  35.9  63.2  90.9  166.5  246.2  291.6  294.4  211.7  130.6
FORIGN  ASSETS  3/  4.0  4.6  7.8  12.7  11.9  16.7  41.0  69.9  100.4  177.9  261.5  310.6  317.9  242.6  169.9
FOEIGIJ  LIASILITIES  4/  1.2  1.1  0.3  0.B  1.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  7.4  8.3
L-s  FOREIGN  DORROMING  5/  1.1  1.6  2.3  2.5  3.0  4.3  5.0  6.4  9.0  11.1  15.2  18.6  23.4  23.5  31.0
CuNoWt IN  NET ASSETS  - 0.1  3.4  4.2  -1.4  4.3  23.6  27.3  27.8  75.6  79.6  45.4  2.5  -52.7  -51.1
S  CHAWGE  IN  NUET  ASSTS  - 3.4  186.8  80.3  -15.4  54.3  191.9  76.3  43.9  33.1  47.6  18.5  1.0  -26.1 -35.3
NeT CLAINS ON GOVERNEET  6/  4.0  S.S  5.5  4.6  6.1  9.1  6.2  4.7  0.0  -22.0  -31.8  -33.1  23.4  64.7  212.5
CLAIMS  ON GoVERMNEMr  7/  5.6  o.8  7.0  6.2  8.0  10.9  9.0  8.8  9.5  9.7  13.1  13.7  46.7  106.5  2S5.3
oowuiNiAY  D YDSITS  5/  1.6  1.3  1.5  1.6  1.9  1.5  2.8  4.1  9.S  31.7  44.8  46.6  23.3  42.1  39.8
CHANG IN  NET CLAIMS  - 1.6  -0.1  -0.8  1.5  3.0  -2.9  -1.S  -4.7  -22.0  -9.8  -1.4  56.5  41.3  147.8
9  CHANGE  IN  MET CLAIMS  - 38.9  -1.4  -15.4  31.5  50.2  -32.1  -24.6  - - 44.4  4.3  -170.7  176.5  221.S
IMPORT DEPOSITS 9/  2.4  2.1  2.5  3.7  3.8  2.0  0.1  5.1  5.9  10.1  12.6  12.0  10.0  25.6  35.9
S  CHANG IMPORT  DEPOSITS  - -10.8  16.8  46.4  4.9  -48.7  -95.4  5566.7  16.5  70.7  25.7  -5.6  -17.1  157.0  40.3
NUWeTARY BASE  IPESOS)  1O/  13.7  15.4  18.9  24.8  30.1  37.6  53.4  74.9  115.0  148.7  192.4  239.2  281.2  333.5  411.9
--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---  --------------------  --  - --  --  --  --  -
SOURE:  IFS  DATA  rILE.
1/-IFS.  LINE  11.d.  MILLIONS OF  US DOLLARS.
2/-MET  FOREIGN  ASSETS OF CENTRAL  BANK  =  FOREIGN  ASSETS  - (FOREIGN  LIABILITIES  +  LONG-TlSR FORIGN  L.*ADZLXTIES3.
3/-IFS.  LINC 11.  aILLIONS  OF PESOS.
4/-IFS.  LIMB 16C.  BILLIONS OF PESOS.
S/-IFS  LINE  16CL,  BILLIONS OF PESOS.
6/-MNU  CLAIMS  OF  CZUSRAL BANK ON OOVERIUENT =  CLAIMS  ON GOVERNUIT  - GOVC  R  I7T  DEPOSITS.
7/-IFS.  LIM  12A.  BILLIONS OF PESOS.
/-IFS.  LINE  160.  BILLIONS  OF  PESOS.
/-IFES  LIME  163.  BILLIONS  OF  PESOS.
10/-IFS.  LINM 14.  BILLIONS  OF PESOS.Tablo S  COLOMBIA#  PAfRKT  INTUtCZST  RAttS AND  IOZloS  DC PRtCNDA  RATZS,
1970-81
Year  sark.et  Rate  of  Real  Market  Interest  Rate  Donon  do  Prenda
Intecesta/  Inflation  /  interest  (ex pos*) Nomlru.C/  Real  (cs  post)
1970  13.3  7.2  6.1  10.0  2.8
1971  16.4  12.6  3.8  10.0  - 2.6
1972  15.6  14.1  1.5  10.0  - 4.1
1973  20.3  22.1  - 1.8  10.0  -12.1
1974  30.4  25.2  5.2  15.0  -10.2
1975  23.8  17.5  6.3  17.O  - 0.5
1976  22.4  25.4  - 3.0  17.0  - 8.4
1917  22.9  27.5  - 4.6  17.0  -10.5
1978  25.9  19.7  6.2  17.0  - 2.7
1979  36.5  26.5  10.0  17.0  - 9.5
1980  41.5  24.5  17.0  24.0  - 0.5
198t  52.5  25.6  26.9  28.8  3.2
*i  CAT. 1'0  d4y  maturity,  averag*  annual  rate.
_/  Consumer  price  index.
Cl/  Average  discount  rate.
Source:  Calculatlons  DNP/U!A/DC  baseu  on  Banco  de  La  Republlca,  Roe@lucLones
do  la  Junta  !onetarls,  Amoba-irta.
Peproduced  from  Colorlbia:  £"  0  Sector  a.d  ;.gri.<uture  Poticies  for
Adustuetent  and  Growth.  -he  3;z.i  _  nk,  Report  ;Vo. i9Jl-CO,  April  20,
1984,  Table  5.3.from .47  in 1974  to .67  in 1979  --  as foreign  reserve  inflows  surged. In
spite  of the  fact  that  the  monetary  authority  introduced  marginal  reserve
requirements  of 100  per^ent  in 1977  in  an attempt  to  reduce  the  monetary
impact  of the  coffee  boom,  the  monetary  aggregates,  not  just the  monetary
base,  grew  well in  excess  of the  growth  rate  of real  GDP.
The  rapid  monetary  expansion  (relative  to  GDP growth)  initially  caused  a
large  drop  in .- eal  interest  rates,  but they  returned  to  positive  levels  by
1979  as the  public  investment  program  expanded  and  inflation  remained  high  by
international  standards. See  Table  5.
In sum,  an important  macroeconomic  effect  of the  1976-80  coffee  boom  was
a temporary  fall  in the  real  interest  rate,  which  was quickly  reversed,  and  a
more  enduring  inflationary  impact. In spite  of large  increases  in  reserve
requirements  imposed  on commercial  banks,  the  Colombian  monetary  authority
was  apparently  unsuccessful  in sterilizing  the  monetary  impact  of the  boom.
This  conclusion  leads  immediately  to the  question:  could  this  monetary  impact
have  been avoided  by more  aggressive  depreciation  of the  domestic  currency,
thereby  reducing  the  extent  of the  real  overvaluation  that  occurred?
C.  Foreign  Reserve  Inflows.  Exchange  Rate  Policy.
and  Capital  Controls
The  movements  of the  real  effective  exchange  rate  and international
reserves  over  the  export  cycle  are  particularly  important  when discussing  the
potential  impacts  and  sustainability  of trade  reform  in the  Colombian
context. As official  reserves  grow  during  booms,  the  likelihood  of trade
liberalization  rises. Conversely,  the  rapidity  with  which  trade  controls  are
re-tightened  as exports  turn  down  depends  on the  size  of the  official  reserve
holdings. In the  early  1980s,  for  example,  the  ccuntry's  international
reserves  were at the  unprecedented  level  of  U.S.$4.8  billion. Hence,  imports
were  allowed  to  grow  rapidly  for  roughly  two  years  after  exports  collapsed  in
1980. The  frightening  rate  at  which  reserves  were  being  lost --  they  dropped
to less  than  US$1.4  billion  by year-end  1984 --  caused  import  restrictions
to  be progressively  tightened  in 1983-85.
In periods  of rapid  export  growth,  foreign-exchange  reserves  have  risen
sharply  as the  monetary  authority  intexvened  to  moderate  the  appreciation  of
the  peso.  This  was  particularly  evident  in the  1976-80  boom  when  the  current
account  moved into  a strong  surplus  position,  and  was  accompanied  by an even
larger  surge  in foreign  exchange  reserves  (as  the  public  sector  began  to
borrow  heavily  in  foreign  markets,  and illegal  drug  money  inflows  surged).
The  purchase  of foreign  exchange  reserves  by the  Banco  de la  Republica  caused
rapid  growth  in  the  monetary  base  and the  money  supply,  as discussed  in the
previous  sub-section.
The  massive  accumulation  of foreign  reserves  by the  central  bank  during
the  1976-80  boom is  reasonably  direct  evidence  that  the  Colombian  peso  would
have  appreciated  sharply  in  nominal  terms  if  the  central  bank  had intervened
less  in  the  foreign  exchange  market. This  strategy  would  have reduced  the
monetary  impact  of the  export  boom,  but the  real  exchange  rate  would  have
73appreciated  more rapidly. From  this  perspective  the  difficult  policy
trade-off  is  between  greater  monetization  of foreign  reserve  inflows  and
greater  exchange  rate  appreciation.
The  foregoing  discussion,  however,  overlooks  an important  policy  option
that  would  reduce  the intensity  of the  policy  dilemma. Colombian  exporters
are forced  to  convert  foreign  exchange  earnings  into  pesos  within  several
months  of their  receipt. Furthermore,  Colombian  residents  at large  are  not
permitted  to  accumulate  foreign  assets. In the  presence  of such  foreign
exchange  controls,  the  large  reserve  inflow  need  not  be an indication  of an
undervalued currency. On the  contrary,  exporters  (not  to  mention  domestic
residents  in general)  who  would,  in the  absence  of convertibility  controls,
choose  to  hold part  of their  foreign  earnings  in  foreign  assets  and  part ir.
the  form  of pesos  are forced  to  hold only  peso  assets. This  forced
conversion  drives  the  supply  of domestic  money  above  the  demand,  thereby
adversaly  affecting  domestic  inflation. It is  possible,  in  this  environment
where  export  earnings  must  be converted  into  domestic  currency,  that  an
upward  valuation  of the  currency  can  make the  inflationary  effect  of the
foreign  reserve  inflows  worse  by converting  a given  quantity  of foreign
exchange  into  a larger  number  of pesos!
Regarding  the  acquisition  of foreign  assets  by domestic  residents,  a
policy  employed  to some  extent  during  the  last  boom  was to  lengthen  the
allowable  period  over  which  exporters  could  hold  foreign  exchange  earnings
before  conversion  into  pesos. This  reduces,  st least  temporarily,  the
monetary  impact  of the  boom.
D.  The  Fiscal  Policy  Pes-onse
The  government  revenue  and  expenditure  implications  of commodity  booms
are also  important. As was  emphasized  above,  unless  the  government  is able
to  genexate  a large  fiscal  surplus  in  boom  periods,  it  may  be extremely
difficult  for  the  monetary  authority  to sterilize  the  expansionary  effect  of
foreign  reserve  inflows  on the  domestic  money  supply.
In the  early  1970s,  the  ce;;ral  government  had  been running  small  fiscal
deficits  in the  range  of 2  percent  of GDP. The  beginning  of the  coffee  boom
(1976)  produced  a small  fiscal  surplus  of 0.8  percent  of  GDP;  government
revenue  grew  by almost  as  much  as the  growth  in  nominal  GDP (28.9  verses  31.4
percent),  while  expenditure  was slow  to adjust  upward  --  presumably  due to
lags  in the  budgetary  process. This,  however,  was temporary. A period  of
rapid growth in government spending began in 1977 --  and, in fact,
accelerated  somewhat  even  after  the  boom  peaked  in 1978. As Table  6  shows,
government  expenditure  grew  at rates  of 29.9,  35.8,  39.4,  and  49.7  percent,
respectively,  during  the  1977-80  period. These  growth  rates  were  well in
excess  of nominal  GDP  growth,  causing  the  ratio  of government  expenditure  to
GDP to rise  from  8.3  percent  in 1976  to  10.8  percent  in 1981. A large
fraction  of the  increase  in  government  spending  was consumption  expenditures,
although  public  investment  also  increased  sharply  after  1979.
74TABLE  6
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE  OF  CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
MILLIONS  OF  PESOS
--------------------------------------------------
DOMESTIC  FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT  NET  NET
YEAR  REVENUE  EXPENDITURE  CONSUMPTION  SURPLUS  BORROWING  BORROWING
---------------------------- _--______________________________________________________-
1971  14388  16076  17100  -1688  461  1227
1972  16085  19759  18140  -3674  396  3278
1973  20361  23159  23010  -2798  -198  2996
1974  26247  29014  28210  -2767  2452  315
1975  38442  39351  36180  -909  1458  -549
1976  48832  44327  43680  4505  -3309  -1196
1977  63417  57597  55220  5820  -4189  -1631
1971  84065  78198  7782k  5867  -3717  -2150
1979  114580  109032  110720  5548  -10762  5214
1980  151823  163217  159370  -11394  -5096  16490
1931  204956  214981  206870  -10025  -9519  19544
1982  257490  291141  272770  -33657  18796  14861
1983  290860  144eb?  I1ISS0  -53807  59955  -6148
1984  299814  429101  424000  -129893  1282S1  1642
3URCE: REVISTA DEL BANco DE LA REPUULICA.  AND  IFS  LINE  91F.
3OTNOTE: DOMESTIC  NET BORROWING  INCLUDES USE OF CASH BALANCES
AND  STATISTICAL  DISCREPANCIES.
GDP  PERCENTAGES  GROWTH RATE
GOVERNMENT  DOMESTIC  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENr  NOMINAL
YEAR  REVENUE  EXPENDITURE  CONSUMPTION  SURPLUS  BORROWING  BORROWING  REVENUE  EXPENDITURE  CONSUMPTION  '  GDP
.____--  --  - - - - --  - - --  - - - - --  - - - - --  - - - --  - - --  - - - - --  --  - - --  - - --  - - - - --  - --  --  --  --  --  - - --  --  --  - - - - - - - - --
1971  9.2  10.1  11.0  -1.1  0.3  0.8  - - * 
1972  8.5  10.4  9.6  -1.9  0.2  1.7  11.8  22.9  6.1  21. 
1973  8.4  9.5  9.5  -1.2  -0.1  1.2  26.6  17.2  26.8  25.2 
1974  8.1  9.0  8.8  -0.9  0.8  0.1  28.9  25.3  22.6  '  32  6
1975  9.5  9.7  8.9  -0.2  0.4  -0.1  46.5  35.6  23.3  25.7
1976  9.2  8.3  8.2  0.8  -0.6  -0:2  127.0  12.6  20.  31.4
1977  8.9  8.0  7.7  0.8  -0.6  -0.2  29.9  29.9  26.4  WS
1971  9.2  8.6  8.6  0.6  -0.4  -0.2  32.6  35.8  40.9  27.0
1979  9.6  9.2  9.3  0.5  -0.9  0.4 1  36.3  39.4  42.3  30.7
1980  9.6  10.3  10.1  -0.7  -0.3  1.0  32.5  49.7  43.9 1  32. 
1961  10.3  10.8  10.4  -0.5  -0.5  1.0  !  35.0  31.7  29.8  25  6
1952  10.3  11.7  10.9  -1.3  0.8  0.6  25.6  35.4  31.9  26.0
1933  9.6  11.4  11.6  -1.8  2.0  -0.2 1  13.0  18.4  28.9  ,  21.6 
1954  8.1  11.6  11.5  -3.5  3.5  .0  3.1  24.7  20.6  21.6
--------------------------------------------- _--_____---____----___----------  -------  -----------------------------------------  ---------p
COLONNIA/  1-28-896FILE  NANE:PUBSECT
TAKLE  I
CONSOLIDATED  PUDLIC  SECTOR  ACTIYITY
1974  1975  1974  1977  1973  1979  1980  1981  1982
TOTAL  REVENUE  80754  108724 155764  223129 322937 433434  423311 7004U7  9082W0
percent  Change  Oa  34.4  43.3  43.2  44.7  35.3  42.2  12.4  29.7
pefcent  of  6SP  25.0  24.3  29.3  31.2  35.5  3b.9  39.5  35.3  34.4
CURRENT  EXPENDITURE  51850  74544  99054 142375  212512  305024 44e..o  520915  443294
pencent  change  no  43.8  32.9  43.7  49.3  43.5  44.5  14.4  27.3
percent  of 6p  1I.I  13.4  19.b  19.9  23.4  25.7  23.3  24.3  26.
NET  TRANSFERS  Of  PUtLIC  SECTOR  11421  23377  19332  42704  40997  73451  95112 111414  15200
pereent  Chnqe  no  104.7  -17.3 120.9  42.3  20.4  29.3  17.1  37.1
percent  of  6O  3.5  5.8  3.4  6.0  4.7  4.2  b.0  5.b  4.2
PUBLIC  SECTOR  SAVIN6  17485 10801 37379 39050 49429  59959 814^  49154  92190
perc  t  change  na  -39.2 244.1  1.6  29.9  21.3  35.9 -16.4  35.2
percent  of  6DP  5.4  2.7  7.0  5.3  5.4  5.0  5.'  3.4  3.7
PUBLIC  SECTOR  FIXED  INVESTNENT  20283 21410 30360  28405 37839  76212 108153 149439  105I  97
percent  change  na  5.6  41.9  -6.4  33.2 101.4  41.9  38.4  23.8
frcent  of  60P  6.3  5.3  5.7  4.0  4.2  6.4  b.3  1.5  7.5
OVERALL  BUDSET  SURPLUS:  -2798  -10609 1018  9645 11599  -16253  -24455  -81U83  -93117
percent  char  na  279.2  -166.2  37.4  20.2  -240.2  64.0  205.7  14.3
percent  of 60P  -0.9  -2.6  1.  1.3  1.3  -1.4  -1.7  -4.1  .30
Source:  Dinco  de  la  Republica  (Sept.  1995  eission).The  government  revenue  effect  of the  boom  was  less  pronounced. Revenues
climbed  from  8.1  percent  of GDP in  1974  to 9.5  percent  in  1975,  reflecting  a
number  of tax  reforms  initiated  in  1974-5. After  that,  during  the  coffee
boom,  revenue  growth  was  just  slightly  greater  than  the  growth  in  GDP,  as
Table  6 shows. Nevertheless,  the  government  failed  to  generate  the
additional revenue needed to nav for the aggressive expansion of
exRenditures.  Consequently,  the  fiscal  surplus  at the  beginning  of the  boom
was  rapidly  eroded. Within  three  years,  a deficit  had  reappeared;  it  grew
steadily  to  3.5  percent  of GDP in  1984  as the  divergence  between  the  growth
in  revenue  and  expenditures  continued.
Initially,  the  deficit  was financed  largely  by external  borrowing  but
after  1982,  when the  availability  of foreign  capital  diminished,  an
increasing  share  of the  fiscal  deficit  was  financed  by domestic  borrowing  --
either  from  the  financial  system  or directly  from  the  central  bank.
Returning  to the  information  on Colombia's  inflation  performance  in
Table  2, it is  noteworthy  that  Colombian  inflation  exceeded  international
rates  by considerably  more than  10  percent  per  annum  throughout  the  1979-82
period. The  fact  that  inflation  continued  to  be high long  after  coffee
prices  peaked  in 1977,  while  fiscal  deficits  soared,  supports  the  hypothesis
of  Rajaram(1985)  discussed  in the  main text. He maintains  commodity  price
booms  should  not  be blamed  for  the  ongoing  inflation  that  many  primary
product  exporters  experienced  during  the  1970s. Rather,  the  blame  should
fall  on the  run-away  government  spending  and  growing  fiscal  deficits  that
typically  accompanied  commodity  booms. Rajaram's  study  focused  on
sub-Saharan  Africa,  but the  same  phenomenon  occurred  in  Colombia.
Government  Consumption
The  pattern  of government  consumption  during  and  after  the  1976-80
coffee  boom  can  be broken  down  into  two  phases. In  the  first  two  years  of
the  boom (1976-77),  Table  6 shows  that  government  consumption  grew  at a
slightly  less  rapid  rate (in  nominal  terms)  than  GDP.  In the  next three
years,  however,  it  accelerated  sharply  --  growing  at annual  rates  of 40.9,
42.3,  and  43.9  percent. It slowed  somewhat  during  the  growth  recession,  but
throughout  the  1978-83  period,  government  consumption  grew  more  rapidly  than
GDP. Between  1977  and  1983,  government  consumption/GDP  rose  from  7.7 to  11.6
percent.
The fact  that  government  consumption  expenditure  accelerated  in  the
1976-80  boom and  decelerated  during  the  1981-84  downturn suggests  that  it
may  have  been  exacerbating  rather  than  smoothing  the  fluctuations  in  GDP
caused  by changes  in  the  external  market. This  behavior  is,  of course,
contrary  to  what is  desirable  from  a  macroeconomic  stabilization  point  of
view.  The  econometric  analysis  in Cuddington  (1986),  however,  could  not
detect  this  strong  procyclical  response  when  examining  the  1950-84  period  as
a  whole.  On the  other  hand, it  did  not  uncover  any  tendency  for  government
spending  to  be adjusted  countercyclicallv  either.
Data  on the  consolidated  public  sector,  which  are  available  on a
consistent  basis  only  for  short  time  periods,  yield  similar  conclusions
75regarding  the  explosive  growth  of the  deficit. According  to Fund  estimates,
the  overall  public-sector  deficit  increased  from  roughly  2.5  percent  of GDP
in 1980  to almost  seven  percent  in 1982,  reflecting  a considerable  expansion
in  expenditure  and  a  weakening  of revenue  growth. In  early  1983,  the
Colombian  authorities  began  to take  medsures  to reduce  the  public-sector
deficit,  including  a reform  of the  income  tax  and  state  and  local  taxes.
While  those  measures  resulted  in a  moderate  increase  in tax  revenue  relative
to  GDP,  and  non-tax  revenue  (especially  that  accruing  to  local  governments)
also increased,  the  public-sector  deficit  continued  to  rise,  reaching  7.6
percent  of GDP in  1983. The  principal  cause  was the  rapid  growth  in  public
expenditures  which  rose  from  24 to  27 percent  of GDP  between  1982  and  1983,
reflecting  strong  increases  in  current  and  capital  expenditures.(IMF,  May
1985  Staff  Report,  pp.3-4.)
In 1984,  the  public  deficit  remained  unchanged  at 7.6  percent  of  GDP,
because  of continued  expenditure  growth,  even  though  revenues  rose  19.7
percent  to 20.9  percent  of  GDP.  This  revenue  gain  reflected  the  full-year
impact  of the  1983  tax  reforms  and  a change  in the  application  of the  sales
tax  to a  value  added  basis (IMF,  oR.cit.,  p5).
Table  7  shows  an alternative  consolidation  of  public-sector  accounts
provided  by thet  Banco  de la  Republica  in September  1985. Like the  central
government  budget  data,  these  data  show  the  same  inability  of revenue  growth
to  match  the  run-away  increases  in  expenditure.  According  to the  BR data,
public-sector  revenue  rose  from  26.8  percent  of GDP  in 1975  to a  peak  of 39.5
percer;t  of GDP in  1980,  before  falling  back  somewhat  as the  economic  slowdown
began. From  1976  until  1981,  however,  the  growth  rate  of current  expenditure
exceeded  revenue  growth. Consequently,  public  saving  declined  from  7.0
percent  of GDP in  1976  to 3.4  percent  in 1981.
In  addition  to  the  rapid  expansion  in  current  expenditures,  capital
investment  also increased  drastically,  particularly  after  1978. The  ratio  of
public  investment  to GDP  rose  from  4.0  percent  in  1977  to 7.5  percent  in 1981
and  1982,  reflecting  major  expansions  in the  electric  and  transportation
sectors  as well  as joint  venture  investments  in  the  oil  and  coal  industries.
Because  the  public  saving  rate  was falling  throughout  the  boom,  the  overall
budget  position  of the  consolidated  public  sector  moved  from  a small  surplus
of 1.3  percent  of GDP in the  early  years  of the  boom (1976-78)  to  a deficit
of 4.1  percent  of CDP  as the  public  investment  program  expanded.
The fiscal  impact  of the  boom can  be  summarized  as follows.
Public-sector  revenue  rose  sharply  as  national  income  surged  ahead  during  the
boom,  setting  the  stage  for  a rapid  rise  in  government  spending.  In the
1977-80  boom, it  was current  expe;ditures  that  rose initially,  followed  a
year  or two later  by increases  in  public  investment  expenditures.  36/  These
36/  Davis  (1983,  p.129)  suggests  that  this  was atypical  among  the
countries  that  benefitted  from  the  1975  78  rise  in  beverage  prices. In  most
of them,  current  expenditure  growth  was  reasonably  restrained  while  capital
spending  increased  sharply.
76investments  were financed  to  a much  greater  extent  than  previously  by
public-sector  borrowing  abroad,  as Table  7 shows.
It should  be mentioned  at this  point  that,  in  situations  where  country
is  experiencing  a commodity  export  boom,  major  increases  in  the  public
expenditure  program  may  have  a destabilizing  short-run  effect  --  regardless
of  whether  or  not they  contribute  to growth  over  the  medium  term. The
problem  is the  procyclical  nature  of the  government  policy. If the  public
investment  program  could  be postponed  until  the  export  boom  wanes,  on the
other  hand,  it  could  potentially  play an important  stabilizing  role.
Regarding  the  sectoral  allocation  of investment,  the  Colombian
government's  strategy  of increasing  investment  in  non-coffee  export
activities  such  as oil  and  coal  production  is  most appropriate,  provided  the
investments  meet  standard  profitability  criteria  when the  international
interest  rate is  used  as the  opportunity  cost  of capital. This  strategy
continues  and  potentially  accelerates  export  diversification,  a long-standing
goal  of the  Colombian  economy.
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